



AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (AFDP) 3-72 NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

EXTENDED DETERRENCE

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Extended deterrence is a commitment to deter and, if necessary, to respond across the spectrum of potential nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios in defense of allies and partners. This commitment is often described as providing a "nuclear umbrella." Extended deterrence also serves as a nonproliferation tool by obviating the need for allies and partners to develop or acquire and field their own nuclear arsenals.

In the case of the <u>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</u> (NATO), the continued deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe is a strategic alliance issue. This ongoing forward basing of US nuclear capabilities not only deters adversaries on behalf of European allies, but also assures NATO partners that the US is capable of helping ensure their collective national security.

According to the <u>NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review</u>, "Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside conventional and missile defense forces.... Consistent with our commitment to remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist, Allies agree...to develop concepts for how to ensure broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their nuclear sharing arrangements." The US also provides a nuclear umbrella over several Pacific partners including Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

Complementing extended deterrence, where the objective is to influence the decision-making of an adversary, <u>assurance</u> involves easing the fears and sensitivities of allies and partners. Extended deterrence and assurance of allies and partners are two sides of the same coin. For example, <u>shows of force</u> shape both allied and adversary beliefs.

For additional discussion on effects, see "<u>Practical Design: The Coercion Continuum</u>" in AFDP 3-0, *Operations and Planning*.