



## SUPPORT TO FID

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### INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID)

The internal dynamics of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and other forms of internal conflict vary with each situation, FID planning should begin with an analysis of the operational environment. Intelligence requirements are based on the commander's information needs and can include risk assessments, analyses of friendly and enemy forces and infrastructures, endemic health threats to deployed personnel, situation reporting, and targeting data. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is a major source of information for FID planning and execution, and counterintelligence resources can be deployed to exploit and neutralize threats received through HUMINT collection.

HUMINT derives from conflict and crisis backgrounds such as historical analysis and cultural factors; social, economic, and political components of the conflict; and the personalities and ambitions of the key players. Early intelligence estimates provide a foundation for establishing proper correlation and priorities among military and nonmilitary airpower roles for both the host nation (HN) and Air Force FID forces. Early assessments derived from basic and estimative intelligence also increase a HN's chances to counter the insurgent or terrorist threat with the least amount of force.

The key to effective employment of US intelligence is early development of essential elements of information (EEIs) by combatant commanders, air component commanders, and intelligence analysts. In all cases, it is essential that commanders understand the operational environment well enough to accurately determine the EEIs for intelligence planning and execution. Commanders should have access to regional area specialists to help develop EEIs. EEIs should be translated into collection requirements for intelligence collection processes, resources, and methodologies.

If an insurgency progresses to the point where intelligence activities are reduced to crisis reporting, non-military options are severely limited. At the crisis stage, the EEIs focus primarily on how large the enemy force is, what its capabilities and intent are, where it is located, and how it can be destroyed. During the early incipient phase, the

questions shift from what and where to who and why. Knowing the answers to this last set of questions allows defenders to address the insurgency, not just the insurgent. Counterintelligence activities can be most effective during this stage to maximize the involvement and participation from HN law enforcement, intelligence, and security agencies to counter the insurgency and to monitor the situation on the ground in the area of responsibility.

## **SPACE SUPPORT TO FID**

[Space support](#) should be integrated into FID at all stages of engagement. Space systems and personnel, for example, provide commanders with [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance](#) (ISR) support; [command and control](#) (C2) support; and [position, navigation, and timing](#) (PNT) services. Proper command relationships, normally [direct liaison authorized](#) (DIRLAUTH), should be established between in-country teams and national agencies, such as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. Those relationships allow in-country teams' access to timely intelligence data and analysis.

Long-haul and over-the-horizon communication systems are vitally important for FID teams operating in austere locations. These teams should have access to the regional [satellite communications](#) (SATCOM) support centers for the areas in which they operate to provide them SATCOM capabilities. Similarly, DIRLAUTH, with the mission management center for blue-force tracking (BFT), allows proper management and use of BFT capabilities.

Many space capabilities and services can be shared with HN forces. Air Force FID planners should take appropriate measures to ensure that security and classification guidelines are in place and followed.

DIRLAUTH with the space [air operations center](#) (AOC) or the [Combined Space Operations Center](#) (CSpOC) allows in-country FID teams' access to Department of Defense (DOD) space support. The space AOC / CSpOC can also request and coordinate reachback to many non-Department of Defense (DOD) space service providers that offer non-DOD, foreign, and commercial space support. The space AOC / CSpOC provides connectivity to many space-service providers that offer ISR, SATCOM, and PNT capabilities. Depending on where the FID effort is taking place, the HN will often have better relations with foreign-service providers than the United States. In those cases, the FID team should provide the HN with information that will enable them to request services directly from sources that may not want to support US efforts.

## **CYBERSPACE SUPPORT TO FID**

Cyberspace support should be integrated into US forces FID planning and activities at all levels of indirect and direct support operations. Cyberspace operations are key force

multipliers, mission assurance providers, and mitigate risk for operations. Refer to Joint Publication 3-12, [Cyberspace Operations](#), and DAFPD 17-2, [Cyber Warfare Operations](#), for additional guidance on cyberspace best practices, capabilities, roles, responsibilities, command relationships and other authorities.

## MEDICAL SUPPORT TO FID

Health issues contribute to irregular warfare struggles for legitimacy and influence, and Air Force medical service professionals routinely operate in [humanitarian and civic assistance](#), [security assistance](#), and FID programs. Medical support can uniquely help FID operations establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve combined integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional cooperation. Therefore, medical support options and personnel should be included in FID planning and operations.

Air Force International Health Specialist (IHS) professionals are trained to support the full continuum of Air Force FID activities and assist joint force commanders and the [commander, Air Force forces](#) achieve objectives and end-states through health-related engagements which foster rapport, understanding, interoperability, and a more effective health infrastructure. Similar to regional area specialists, IHS professionals are proficient in regional cultures and often foreign languages.

## COMBAT SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

[Combat Support](#) (CS) elements play a dominant role in security assistance and form the backbone of [indirect](#) Air Force FID assistance. Air Force CS elements also support US force deployment and specific joint and multinational operations in more [direct](#) forms of support. Information developed by Air Force CS elements through site surveys, joint and multinational exercises, CS studies, and other assessments supporting security assistance activities may contain significant information for planners. A key step in CS planning is to understand HN [internal defense and development](#) (IDAD) strategy and define its aviation requirements and capabilities.

The HN's IDAD strategy should be understood and its aviation requirements and capabilities defined before detailed CS planning commences. Accordingly, CS planning for significant force structure improvements should focus initially on what the HN intends to do, or can do, for itself. Specifically:

- ✦ How the host government intends to employ its national resources to reach its IDAD goals.
- ✦ What immediate and long-range priorities are assigned to the IDAD strategy.
- ✦ How the HN intends to employ airpower to support both military and nonmilitary objectives contained in the overall strategy.

- ✦ What the host-nation's capacity is to receive, store, operate, and maintain both present and projected air, space, and information resources.

Resource priorities should align with objectives identified in the IDAD plan, along with strategy-to-task FID planning. CS planning should take into account the limited logistics infrastructures often prevalent in developing nations and consider social, economic, and political factors that could enhance or impede Air Force CS operations.

## **MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

[Military information support operations](#) (MISO) and FID operations can be complementary and produce synergistic effects. MISO considerations and planning should be included in all FID activities, even when those activities are not primarily designed to achieve influential effects. Operations and logistics planners at all levels of command should carefully consider the psychological implications of any Air Force action involving direct or indirect support to a foreign government. Accordingly, MISO planning should be closely tied to all-source intelligence on friendly and hostile elements. FID planners should also anticipate enemy information operations directed at Air Force operations in the HN and use MISO to maximize the positive effects of Air Force activities in support of the HN. Operations likely to generate counterpropaganda operations requirements should be coordinated with appropriate US and HN public affairs and information agencies.

## **CIVIL AFFAIRS**

In some circumstances, US Army or Marine Corps [civil affairs](#) (CA) augmentation teams may support Air Force elements deployed overseas on FID operations. FID planners should identify requirements for CA support early in the planning process. CA teams can assist in preparing overseas bases and facilities by securing local acceptance and support of Air Force operations. CA teams can also assist deployed Air Force forces by providing information on local civilian attitudes, culture, religions, ethics, infrastructure, and conflict dynamics in the area of operations. CA teams can also coordinate Air Force humanitarian and civic assistance and civic action programs and help HN authorities secure the cooperation and support of their own citizens.

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