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Foreign Internal Defense (FID) doctrine is constantly evolving. It should guide us to effectively organize and employ through the complexities of counterinsurgency and steady-state operations, and help us re-learn the lessons of large-scale peer and near-peer conflict and competition in contested environments. As we continuously improve our airpower capabilities and capacities in air, space, and cyberspace, our ability to revolutionize FID and incorporate new concepts and technologies will identify the new best practices that shape future FID doctrine. The competition continuum that encompasses the range of military operations, from peacetime through large-scale combat, is always a consideration when determining the best practices for our Air Force. Consideration of peer and near-peer competition is a continuing necessity for doctrine as the Air Force supports the joint fight. Every Airman is an innovator and is integral to this continuous development process—we should all connect, share, and learn together to succeed. FID in a contested environment against a peer adversary requires the air component to be more adaptive, resilient, and agile in its deployment and employment plans and leadership philosophies.

FID is defined as participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs or activities undertaken by a host nation (HN) government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security (Joint Publication [JP] 3-22, FID). The US Army devised the term FID in 1976 as a euphemism for “support for counterinsurgency.” In reality, FID is a broad mission involving the total political, economic, informational, and military support the US provides to enable other governments to field viable internal defense and development (IDAD) programs for counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, counter-narcotics, and other threats to its security. FID is a component of irregular warfare (IW), defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. For more information on IW, see Annex 3-2, Irregular Warfare.

The National Security Council provides planning guidance for FID at the strategic level. The Department of State (DOS) is normally designated the lead agency for execution, while the Department of Defense (DOD) provides personnel and equipment to help
achieve military FID objectives. The strategic end state is a HN capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to address subversion, insurgency, lawlessness, terrorism and other threats to its security. The goal of FID activities during stability operations is to preclude future major US combat involvement.

Incorporating all elements of national power, FID applies across the continuum of conflict and competition. Moving across the thresholds that separate one level of engagement from the next carries serious legal and policy implications for the United States. The preferred methods of helping another country are through education and developmental assistance programs. Most Air Force FID actions entail working by, with, and through foreign aviation forces, foreign law enforcement, counterintelligence and security agencies to achieve US strategic and operational objectives.

FID can entail the use of US combat units and advisors in roles aimed at stabilizing the security and survival of a HN and vital institutions under siege by insurgents. FID includes military training and equipping, technical assistance, advisory support, aviation enterprise development, and tactical operations, counterintelligence cooperation and threat information exchanges. Military assistance should be closely coordinated with diplomatic, economic, and informational initiatives.

Air Force FID actions should be designed to support and reinforce the HN’s formal or informal IDAD strategy, its overarching strategy that focuses the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. The Air Force provides FID assistance to the HN’s air forces, but it may assist other military Services and civil agencies, depending on how air support responsibilities are assigned within the HN and on the types of airpower assets employed.

Air Force FID incorporates a broad range of airpower. FID operations are usually conducted jointly with other US Service components and government agencies and combined with the activities of foreign military forces in the HN. The Air Force can conduct operations in support of nation-assistance programs or specific FID activities of other US Government agencies.

The Air Force uses combat support (CS) capabilities to create, prepare, deploy, employ, sustain, protect, and redeploy Air Forces to conduct FID operations. Failure to incorporate combat support early in any operation may result in the inability of Air Force capabilities to create the desired effects in a given conflict. For more information, see Annex 4-0, Combat Support.

Air Force FID operations fall under the broad category of nation assistance. Nation assistance is comprised of four separate but complementary programs: humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), security assistance (SA), FID and security force assistance (SFA). Security assistance, though having much broader application than FID, can be integrated with FID strategies and operations. Security assistance may be designed to
help select countries meet their internal defense needs, to promote sustainable
development and growth of responsive institutions. There is a distinction between
personnel performing mission activities under the command and control of a combatant
commander and personnel performing those activities under the laws, regulations, and
funding applicable to Title 22, United States Code, Foreign Relations and Intercourse,
Chapter 32 (§2151), “Foreign Assistance.” This legal distinction profoundly influences
many aspects of the operation. See JP 3-22, Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” for
more information.

FID operations may be conducted in the HN, in other friendly foreign countries, or in the
United States. Air Force regional area specialists proficient in foreign languages and
cultures help geographic combatant commanders sustain coalitions, achieve regional
stability, and contribute to multinational operations and FID efforts. Language
capabilities and international skills are a force multiplier and essential to the Air Force’s
ability to operate globally.

Air Force FID has a strong potential to reinforce the HN government’s security,
removing the threat, but it also has the potential to undermine the democratization
sought in US policy. Further, airpower may concentrate the use of force into a small
number of government officials, who can use it to attack the civilian government or civil
society and reform organizations that promote democratization. AF FID efforts should
always support the larger process of political reform necessary to address the
underlying threats to internal security.
Air Force foreign internal defense (FID) operations are primarily aimed at developing and improving host nation (HN) airpower capabilities. FID activities can take a variety of forms and should address the overall needs and capabilities of foreign airpower employment and sustainment.

A principal US instrument for conducting FID is the transfer of major items (weapon systems and related support capabilities) to selected HNs, primarily through the security assistance program. The Air Force often facilitates such transfers through operational and strategic assessments, airpower studies, security assistance (SA)-funded aircraft refurbishment, airlift of SA-funded defense articles, training on specific weapon systems and support capabilities through SA-funded mobile training teams, and SA case management and oversight. Delivery of foreign military sales items can be performed in conjunction with multinational operations and contingencies and with other training programs conducted by the geographic combatant commander (GCC) and by various departments and agencies of the US Government.

Air Force training and advisory assistance may be employed to facilitate the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of foreign aviation forces engaged in internal defense and development (IDAD) operations and in joint or multinational contingencies and actions. Training and advisory operations may be a cost-effective means of helping HNs deal with internal problems before they assume regional or global dimensions. This assistance can also build enduring relationships with foreign officials who may provide or facilitate access to important resources and basing during crises or emerging contingencies. Bonds of trust between advisors and foreign military leaders, forged during FID activities, have often overcome critical access problems.

Air Force FID operations can establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve combined integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional cooperation. If necessary, commanders can employ a greater range of capabilities and resources in more direct forms of FID support when HN aviation units are inadequately sized or structured to make necessary and timely contributions to their own defense effort. The “FID Activities” figure summarizes the principal Air Force FID activities to accomplish FID objectives.
Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the Security Assistance Program to eligible foreign government aviation units engaged in IDAD operations.

Assess foreign military aviation capabilities and provide direction or recommendations towards improving host-nation airpower employment and sustainment methods. Aviation assessments are carried out primarily in support of GCC requirements and for other key agencies and departments of the US government. Assessments focus on foreign aviation capabilities and limitations, specifically aircrew capability and safety, aircraft airworthiness, critical resource availability, resource sustainability, and operational potential.

Train foreign military forces to operate, sustain, and improve indigenous airpower resources and capabilities. Training normally includes tactics, techniques, and procedures in such areas as command and control (C2); combat search and rescue (CSAR); communications systems support; air-space-ground interface; aerial insertion, extraction, and resupply; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); close air support; air interdiction; and airdrop operations. Appropriately funded training can be used to close specific gaps in foreign aviation operations and combat support skills and raise the level of competency where they can be advised on the proper employment of acquired capabilities. FID mission capabilities are tailored to the needs of the HN. Capabilities common to FID missions include training assistance in aviation and airfield topics as well as support and sustainment areas including aircraft maintenance; logistics; life support; medical; force protection; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; personnel recovery; munitions; ground safety; and other capabilities supporting combat air operations and aviation.
Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to employ airpower in specific operational situations. Advisors inform GCCs on foreign airpower capabilities, limitations, potential roles supporting operations, and aviation enterprise development. Advising is conducted within the context of the operational environment. Advisory assistance addresses such areas as airpower doctrine (i.e., how to employ airpower as opposed to how to operate airplanes), mission planning, basing concepts, operational sustainment methods, tactical employment, communications capabilities, protection through approved cyberspace support, C2 development and employment, and the use of available space products for real-world operations and contingency actions. Along with training, Air Force advisory assistance helps foreign military forces and government agencies generate and sustain airpower supporting IDAD programs.

Assist foreign aviation forces in executing specific missions or contingency operations. Assistance can take on many forms, but generally includes hands-on assistance in combat support capabilities such as aircraft maintenance, fuels, health services support, and aviation medicine. Assistance may also include operational capabilities like C2, intelligence exploitation, aircrew mission planning, use of available space products, protection of operational communications systems through approved cyberspace procedures and direct on-board advisory assistance in tactical operations. In the tactical realm, assistance can be applied to such functions as CSAR, airlift, personnel insertion and extraction, casualty evacuation, ISR, counterintelligence and/or law enforcement information, and air attack.

Facilitate force integration for multinational operations. Air Force personnel bring all other key tasks (assessing, training, advising, and assisting) together in a coordinated effort to draw foreign aviation forces into joint or multinational operations.

Provide support to host countries by using Air Force resources to provide intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement support, communications capability, logistics support, and airpower effects.
The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The political, economic, and physical terrains of host nations (HNs) present significant challenges to both US and HN air forces.

The greatest foreign internal defense (FID) environmental challenge is understanding the nature of irregular conflicts that can impact US national security interests and the security interests of important friends and partners. The first step should be to identify the nature of the threat, the administrative and financial mechanisms that power them, and the relevant beliefs and ideologies. The way insurgency is fought has an enormous influence on the types of forces and weapon systems that can be successfully employed.

The global information environment contributes to the efficacy of these concepts. Commanders should apply as much effort to information operations as other FID initiatives since these activities, as part of a broader strategic communication plan, can be a force multiplier. Strategic communication shapes perceptions at the global, regional and national levels. Air Force operations can play a significant supporting role in the US Government to communicate policy and demonstrate US commitment.

The lessons derived from the classic models, or paradigms, of insurgency, small wars, and terrorism are crucial for recognizing and analyzing conflicts. Subjects should include political, economic, and military imperatives governing internal defense and development (IDAD) strategies as well as the basic concepts of insurgency.

Commanders should carefully examine the operational environment. Studies and analyses should address the characteristics of current and emerging insurgency threats. Insurgency models are not entirely sufficient to describe the impact when a local or regional insurgency is exported on a global scale against established or emerging governments that foster, sponsor, or accommodate forces of change and modernization.
SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

Major environmental factors affecting FID planning and execution include physical and psychological pressures from hostile elements, social fragmentation, political instability, and economic impoverishment. Difficult terrain, physical isolation of population groups, and poorly developed infrastructures often impede counterinsurgency and FID operations. Airpower, because of its inherent flexibility, can overcome many of these obstacles.

Nations most susceptible to lawlessness, subversion, terrorism, and insurgency, and other threats to internal security are characterized by social, economic, and political fragmentation and a lack of national identity within population groups who resist, or are denied, integration into the national community. Political and ethnic alienation, separatism, and lack of accessibility to government resources by certain groups, poor income distribution among social classes, and disenfranchisement or lack of other political rights contribute to fragmentation. Situations most likely to involve Air Force FID activities are prevalent in developing nations where public services, industrial infrastructures, and air support facilities are relatively underdeveloped by Western standards.

Terrain, seasonal weather patterns, physical isolation of population groups, and poorly developed physical infrastructures often impede military operations. Rugged or austere terrain, adverse climate, and the scarcity of improved airfields affect the tempo, scale, and character of air operations and restrict the types of aircraft that can be employed. Such obstacles also provide opportunities to effectively employ airpower. In some operational environments, Airpower offers significant advantages in rural administration, logistics, and tactical mobility.
Subversion, insurgency, lawlessness, and terrorism manifest themselves in a variety of forms capable of challenging the authority and survival of host nations. Below are examples of internal threats that may require Air Force foreign internal defense (FID) assistance. Strategic and operational level planning should address the degree to which each one of these forms manifests itself in the overall threat to HN internal security.

**SUBVERSION**

Subversion is an action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. At one end of the scale, subversion may weaken government authority through extortion, bribery, and physical threats. In other cases, it can provoke widespread civil disorder eventually leading to political and economic crises, ethnic and religious confrontations, and armed disputes among rival political factions external to the government. Dissident groups may use propaganda and terrorism to dramatize political causes or to extort concessions from host governments. Civil disorder and anarchy can produce widespread violence and social upheaval precipitating a host government’s collapse. These situations can result in possible military support to civil law enforcement agencies in certain circumstances permitted by law.

**INSURGENCY**

Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgencies often develop as a result of internal perceptions that a host government is unable or unwilling to solve important domestic, economic, or political problems. An insurgent’s aim is attaining legitimacy derived from popular support. Popular support fuels the political mobilization required to generate workers, fighters, money, and weapons while denying the same to the government. Preemptively addressing critical economic and political issues by host governments is central to countering insurgencies and should generally take precedence over military force. Insurgency often assumes an ideological foundation with social, economic, political, or religious components. The relationship of force application to the central issues underlying an insurgency warrants special consideration in planning. Insurgency
dominates the direction of violent political change occurring in the world today. Appendix A discusses the principles of classic insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Insurgencies have individual characteristics that commanders should take into account when initiating FID operations. It is imperative that commanders understand the nature of the conflict. The essential elements of information typically shift from empirical estimates (enemy strength, position, tactical posture, and direction of movement) to cultural and political identity and motivation. Standard insurgency-counterinsurgency paradigms may not work. A failure to critically analyze an insurgent conflict and determine its nature at the beginning of a confrontation can waste resources and potentially fuel further insurgency.

LAWLESSNESS

The term lawlessness, as it applies to FID, carries the connotation of anarchy and revolt, indiscriminate killing by insurgents, narco-terrorists, gangs, and warlords, as well as theft and destruction of property.

Lawlessness often occurs when a government has marginal or ineffective oversight and control over its population or territories. Lawlessness may also exist when the government lacks the mechanisms required to monitor and control the formation and activities of subversive organizations. Local dissident groups may use terrorism against government agencies, or against other ethnic or religious groups, to demonstrate and reinforce their claims to autonomy. The inability of a government to extend its administration and influence into outlying regions typically results in the emergence of “ungoverned territories.” This is often the result of not having the technological means to provide physical presence and persistence in forward areas. Airpower can help alleviate this deficiency.

Subversion, insurgency, illegal drug production, and narco-terrorism all go hand-in-hand with lawlessness. Illicit drug production and trafficking can function subversively when international drug cartels seek permissive environments and resort to intimidation and violence to suppress government interference. “Partnerships” involving exchanges of drugs, weapons, and money between insurgents and drug cartels may also support subversive activities, terrorist organizations, and revolutionary movements. Terrorist organizations, insurgents, and drug cartels often share common infrastructures. Lawlessness is destabilizing to a legitimate regime and may also serve to promote insurgent goals.

TERRORISM

Terrorism is a tactic employed in insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Terrorism uses intimidation and violence to achieve its aims, which are usually linked to a goal or cause. Terrorism may pursue religious, political, and ideological goals. It may aim to replace governments and regimes that yield to, or encourage, forces of change and modernization that threaten religious orders and ways of life. In other cases, terrorism
may be used to gain political or economic concessions from a host government.

When political mobilization and legitimacy form the critical centers of gravity, a goal of terrorism is often to demonstrate the inability of regimes to defend themselves and their populations. Terrorism is generally considered a major component or tactical instrument, not necessarily a separate, stand-alone phenomenon without ideological or political context and motivation.

US security interests can be adversely affected when HN governments are threatened by terrorist violence. The internal security of partners and allies may require US assistance through FID. In addition to helping manage internal conflicts through training and advisory assistance, the Air Force can help with intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, and certain forms of direct assistance.
Air Force **foreign internal defense** (FID) operations generally focus on support to host nation (HN) aviation forces. The scale of military **airpower** operations in lesser-developed nations is relatively small in terms of force size, total sortie potential, resource consumption and availability, and overall support costs. The contributions of HN aircraft can be vital to the success of its **internal defense and development** (IDAD) strategy. When host governments possess only a few aircraft, airframe availability, maintenance turnaround times, flight safety, and sortie generation rates are critical.

Sustainment and supportability are difficult problems with small HN inventories. Funding constraints and supply shortages in host countries can amplify logistics problems. The grounding or combat loss of relatively few aircraft can impair or neutralize an air effort.

Air Force commanders conducting FID operations should anticipate differences between US and foreign organizational structures and personnel policies. These differences should be taken into account in planning and executing FID training and advisory assistance. High degrees of centralization and division of labor are prevalent in the military cultures of developing nations. Giving noncommissioned officers and company grade commissioned officers any significant degree of authority and responsibility is not a priority for most air force units in lesser-developed nations.

Conversely, some HNs recognize and embrace the requirement for new administrative structures and authority distribution. This enhances operational effectiveness during counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations through improved flexibility and organizational effectiveness. There are important opportunities at many locations for senior Air Force officers and enlisted personnel to train and advise foreign counterparts on how to organize, direct, and supervise airpower forces.

The US Air Force model may not translate readily into a HN’s situation, nor may a complex organization be necessary in consideration of the HN’s air force size and complexity. The US model may not be appropriate for a small HN air force using a smaller, less sophisticated fleet of aircraft. Training and advice should be tailored to the
HN's needs and the operational environment, not simply advocate for recreating the US Air Force on a smaller scale.

HNs threatened by insurgency and other forms of internal conflict usually require some form of outside financial or materiel assistance to acquire, operate, and maintain their air forces. In some cases, their military aviation programs are entirely dependent upon foreign assistance for major weapon systems, aviation support equipment, aircraft spares, training, advice, technical services, survival equipment, specialized clothing, munitions, and even consumables.

AIRCRAFT

HN military aircraft available for COIN operations (air mobility; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); air battle management; and air attack) are typically well-used, older-generation aircraft. In most cases, these aircraft are non-standard to US Air Force inventories and are difficult to maintain because of dwindling sources of spare parts and supplies. FID activities in those countries are complicated by lack of commonality with US Air Force platforms and parts inventories. The cost and complexity of modern aircraft systems usually rule out new procurement and magnify life-cycle support problems. Older-generation, non-standard aircraft may be the only viable option for HNs.

Lesser-developed partner nations generally possess few, if any, precision-guided munitions. Most air forces in the developing world lack the capacity to conduct close air support at night. Many air forces are capable of “area engagement” but not “precision engagement.”

Developing nations may lack an effective strike capability. Many nations in the developing world possess weapons delivery platforms but cannot field them because of restricted funding for operations and maintenance. Most of these aircraft remain grounded because of a lack of spare parts and fuel.

AIR FACILITIES

Aerial port facilities vary. Most capital cities in developing nations are served by major airports. However, conducting military air operations from major civilian airports is often impractical, due to traffic congestion, space restrictions, and political sensitivity. Outside capital cities, civil and military aviation support facilities are relatively primitive. Military aviation units often have access to only a few main operating locations with hard-surface runways.

Forward operating locations usually consist of short, unimproved airstrips with limited approach or runway lighting, central electric power, and no passive defense capabilities. Modern, ground-based navigational aids may be limited. Non-directional beacons are
prevalent, though often unreliable. Except for navigation aids found at air installations occupied by US military forces, there are generally no terminal approach aids outside international airports. Consequently, military flying operations rely extensively on visual flight rules procedures or global positioning system navigation.

**INTELLIGENCE**

Intelligence capabilities (including collection; processing, exploitation, and dissemination [PED] of the information or intelligence; analysis; counterintelligence activities, and other related skills) are limited in scope. From the multiple intelligence disciplines, human intelligence (HUMINT) is often the best source for intelligence many HNs possess. Additionally, counterintelligence activities against internal and local threats are often the HNs best capability to neutralize and exploit intelligence information received through HUMINT. However, it is limited by the lack of all-source analysis or fusion and uncertain source credibility. Many HNs also possess reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft with limited capability to conduct imagery intelligence and signal intelligence.

The lack of efficient procedures for timely dissemination of tactical intelligence often degrades overall mission effectiveness. Aviation units in developing nations rarely understand how to incorporate intelligence products into the mission planning process. Therefore, it is important to also emphasize (as part of the overall FID mission) the use and significance of basic intelligence analysis skills, to include the PED process. HN acquisition of technical intelligence (collection) capabilities should be accompanied by the use of acquired technology and by the analytical skills that will turn the collection into actionable intelligence.
Air Force foreign internal defense (FID) operations are founded on the basic tenets of airpower. These tenets, which apply equally to US and host nation (HN) forces, include centralized control and decentralized execution, flexibility and versatility, synergistic effects, persistence, concentration, balance, and priority. Specific methods, applications, and expectations, may vary according to the nature of the conflict.

Airpower plays a critical role in supporting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and entails supporting civil law-enforcement agencies and government administrative mechanisms, as well as military surface forces. For additional discussions on support to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism see Annex 3-2, Irregular Warfare. The most commonly employed airpower functions in FID include air mobility, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and command and control (C2).

In counterinsurgency, civilian security and stability are of utmost importance. Air strikes are significantly restricted in order to limit collateral damage. The lesser requirement for kinetic effects does not obviate the importance of armed aircraft. Close air support, for example, may prove critical in situations with friendly troops in close contact with hostile forces. Interdiction may be required prior to launching operations against armed terrorist and insurgent targets. Armed aircraft can also accomplish route reconnaissance, defend convoys, and combat search and rescue. A major challenge for commanders is achieving a proper balance between lethal and non-lethal effects and assigning realistic priorities to the use of military force.

The HN’s internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy provides the basis for determining appropriate airpower objectives. Accordingly, Air Force FID assistance should be designed to support and reinforce the host-nation’s IDAD strategy. A typical IDAD strategy, illustrated in the IDAD Strategy figure, incorporates four basic functions designed to help prevent or counter internal threats. Airpower operations are most successful when their resources and methods support the total range of IDAD strategies.
**IDAD Strategy: Basic Functions**

- Develop balanced social, economic, and political institutions.
- Mobilize manpower and materiel.
- Secure the population and natural resources.
- Neutralize hostile elements.

**Internal defense and development (IDAD)** is defined as “the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society.”

Airpower resources should help the host nation (HN) government administer and create synergies among various defense and development initiatives. These roles are principally combat support capabilities such as aircraft maintenance, parts supply, fuels, and communications efforts to establish government influence and control in contested areas of the country. Mobile, space-based command and control (C2), for example, allows HN forces to operate with a non-intrusive footprint in contested areas. Using airpower in these roles enhances the host government’s ability to focus on political and economic solutions to a crisis. Airpower’s flexibility can help government forces achieve rapid concentration of effort from great distances and overcome restrictive terrain.

US and foreign commanders, as well as Air Force advisors, planners, and analysts, should carefully weigh the likely consequences of applying airpower in an environment where the critical center of gravity is not always the defeat and destruction of opposing forces but generally political mobilization and credibility.

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1 Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*. 
Where a negative impact on the civilian population provides further legitimacy to the insurgent movement, assigning correct airpower priorities may mean the difference between success and failure. Where friendly lives and property are at risk from insurgent attack, for instance, air combat power should function as a component of coordinated joint security and neutralization actions aimed at creating a safe environment for developmental programs that in turn promote and sustain political mobilization and credibility.

DEVELOPMENT AND MOBILIZATION

The US role in development and mobilization is especially useful, where ground lines of communication are untenable because of terrain or enemy presence. Aerial logistics and communications networks establish critical links between the government and the population by carrying information, supplies, and services to civilians. Initiatives such as health care infrastructure development contribute to regional stability and government legitimacy while improving rapport with and understanding of HN populations.

SECURITY AND NEUTRALIZATION

A government defending itself and the population against insurgent attack must be able to exercise two additional critical functions—security and neutralization. Security entails specific government actions to protect vital human and institutional resources and, create a permissive environment for balanced development and mobilization. Neutralization employs civil law enforcement and military forces in to physically and psychologically separate insurgents from the population. Tools for neutralization range from information operations to combat engagement.

Airpower can contribute most effectively to security and neutralization when it functions as an integrated, joint component of the overall internal defense effort. It is least effective when employed unilaterally as a substitute for ground maneuver or long-range artillery. In many instances, airpower can be exploited to greatest advantage by emphasizing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, C2, and logistics mobility.

Typically, insurgents are unwilling to concentrate their forces and are integrated within the civilian population, presenting difficult and contentious targets for attack. The application of ground firepower, an errant bomb, loss of civilian life, or damage to civilian property during neutralization operations can be used against the government and encourage support for the insurgents. In some cases, it may be more appropriate to use airpower primarily to deploy, sustain, and reinforce military surface forces and civil law enforcement agencies. Properly employed airpower can demonstrate to the population that a legitimate government is in control.
Airpower assets can work synergistically to support foreign internal defense (FID) operations, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Commanders should consider the political, economic, informational, and military implications of using the functions of airpower.

AIR MOBILITY

Air mobility increases the government’s capacity to govern and administer through presence and persistence in otherwise inaccessible regions of the country, and by physically extending the reach of public policy and information programs. Air mobility also provides a means of rapidly transporting security forces and supplies to forward areas.

Air transportation can access remote regions and bring resources and personnel in order to promote balanced development and mobilization through nation assistance. Airlift can carry specialists and trainers to remote regions to provide on-site technical training and assistance in areas such as public services management, sanitation and hygiene, agronomy, agribusiness management and technology, veterinary medicine, ecology, environmental protection, and public schools administration.

Air mobility can also support developmental initiatives by delivering construction equipment, supplies, and personnel for building rural housing projects, power generation plants and hydroelectric facilities, bridge building, and other public works programs. Air mobility can support security and neutralization by deploying, sustaining, and reinforcing civil law enforcement agencies as well as military and paramilitary surface elements. Air mobility has also successfully supported political goals by extending the electoral process to rural groups.

Logistics tasks are carried out through air landing, airdrop, and aerial extraction of equipment, supplies, and personnel. Air mobility operations can include any combination of combat operations, casualty evacuation, emergency extraction of military forces, noncombatant evacuation, troop movement, and resupply. Air mobility can also be used for infiltration and recovery of ground reconnaissance teams, surveillance personnel, and special intelligence resources. Tactical battlefield
mobility, including casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and logistics support for surface combat units, is a vital airpower function for maintaining security and neutralizing hostile forces during counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism operations. Both fixed-wing and vertical-lift airlift play crucial roles. Fixed-wing transports are best suited for carrying ground assault forces into forward staging areas for tactical insertion by vertical lift aircraft. Fixed-winged and vertical lift aircraft are ideal platforms to carry ground assault teams into the immediate target area or employment site. CASEVAC should be integral to any operation involving the employment of personnel in hostile-fire situations. Vertical lift aircraft are best suited for this task because of their vertical retrieval capability and their ability to land and take off in the immediate vicinity of the target area.

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

Combat support (CS) operations in FID may be designed to support US-only operations, multinational operations, enable host nation (HN) airpower capabilities against irregular threats, or a combination thereof. CS may transition from a purely Air Force support role to one of more direct involvement as when training HN aviation forces in such areas as maintenance, air base defense, medical, etc. Commanders should consider the following factors when employing CS in FID:

- Operating in austere environments with limited infrastructure.
- Increased combat readiness for surviving and operating in increased threat environments to include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments.
- Increased security and force protection requirements.
- Extended logistical lines.
- Communications limitations.
- Multiple distributed operations.

HN forces’ combat support capabilities should be assessed and training and education developed to ensure full mission capability.

**INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE**

Airpower can help commanders maintain situational awareness through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Airpower can provide intelligence collection capabilities for security and neutralization. These capabilities may provide intelligence to civilian law enforcement agencies or to military and paramilitary units. Platforms equipped with signals intelligence (SIGINT) or geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities can identify and assess insurgent, terrorist, or drug enterprise
infrastructures. SIGINT and GEOINT capabilities can provide real time battlefield awareness and battle damage assessments, and identify and pinpoint high value targets in real time.

In many cases, the most useful intelligence in counterinsurgency and combating terrorism operations has proven to be human intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT-derived information can yield insights into sources and potential vectors of destabilization and revolt before a situation spirals out of control; while counterintelligence activities can be employed to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, and neutralize the threats. It can be used to build strategic assessments and plans for internal defense and development (IDAD), and for planning US strategic paths. HUMINT can provide information on how well US FID programs are working in other countries and how HN authorities intend to employ FID-provided weapons and training. This information can be used to improve or modify the FID effort.

Air or space-based reconnaissance and surveillance can be used to monitor the condition of isolated friendly enclaves, surface lines of communication, and civilian population groups, or to collect intelligence on enemy strength, location, and movement in denied areas. Information on hostile activities is also accessible through other intelligence disciplines, including HUMINT; and threat information exchanges through joint counter intelligence and law enforcement activities. Airpower assets can expand and accelerate the HUMINT process by opening up collection sites not accessible by surface transportation, and by speeding up collection and recovery of time-sensitive data.

ISR is a critical airpower function in counterinsurgency. Air or space-based ISR are rarely a replacement for HUMINT, however ISR is the principal capability that enables governments to maintain situational awareness of ground events and the physical disposition of insurgent forces within the country’s borders. ISR is also employed during dynamic targeting. The platforms best suited for this mission are equipped with electro-optical sensors and deployed to detect, identify, and report maneuvering adversaries and cross-border traffic. The principal task of ISR supporting offensive security and neutralization is finding and identifying targets for exploitation by HN forces.

Many ISR requirements can be satisfied through unmanned aircraft systems. However, there will continue to be a need for manned ISR platforms in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Training on processing, exploitation, and dissemination; and overall intelligence-related skills should also be included as part of the overall FID ISR mission.

COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS

In a COIN operation, the counterland mission includes air interdiction and close air support (CAS) with an emphasis on precision engagement. Counterland neutralizes or degrades enemy resistance before employing ground assault teams. The COIN
counterland sequence normally flows in sequence from aerial ISR into interdiction for target preparation before insertion of ground assault forces, and from there into CAS and CASEVAC and, finally, to air cover for extraction.

The applications of counterland for security and neutralization are in instances when hostile elements openly commit their forces during assembly and attack or when their command and control centers and logistics elements are exposed and identified.

Counterland operations should be planned and executed on a scale commensurate with the required effects. When countering certain forms of lawlessness (e.g., illicit narcotics production and civil disorders), surface operations are generally aimed at controlling territory, arresting people, and seizing contraband rather than inflicting casualties. CAS, if required, should be limited to protecting the surface forces by using tactics and munitions designed for suppression, shock, and intimidation, rather than maximum lethality.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Personnel recovery (PR) operations can be employed in virtually every aspect of counterinsurgency air operations. The mission of AF Rescue is PR and the method by which they accomplish this is combat search and rescue (CSAR). Air Force PR is prepared to accomplish other missions to include non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and CASEVAC. CSAR remains the primary mission and is the most difficult. For additional information, see Annex 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

Reliable CSAR and CASEVAC, especially at night, historically improves the willingness and ability of HN ground forces to engage in operations they may otherwise be less motivated to perform. This was particularly noticeable in the Philippines in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Philippine ground forces would not engage terrorists at night knowing there was no night CASEVAC capability available. Ground combat teams began night operations immediately after the Philippine Air Force acquired this capability provided by Air Force combat aviation advisors.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND INFORMATION RELATED CAPABILITIES

The informational and psychological effects of using air assets can have significant consequences when interacting with a HN. The information operations (IO) planning function ensures that these consequences are fully examined prior to taking actions. The effective planning and employment of information related capabilities (IRCs) can create a desired effect on adversary, neutral, and friendly decision making contributing towards a specified set of behaviors.

IRCs are the individual tools, techniques, or activities using data, information, or knowledge to create effects and operationally desirable conditions within the information environment. IRCs may include operations security, military deception,
military information support operations (MISO), public affairs, Air Force information network and electromagnetic warfare (EW) operations. IRCs may also include activities such as counterpropaganda, engagements, and shows of force. IRCs can be employed individually or in combinations to create effects.

Airpower provides MISO capabilities such as delivering information by radio, television, loudspeakers, and print. Using air mobility to establish the physical presence of government officials at isolated locations increases and improves information dissemination and collection efforts with the added benefit of building psychological support among target audiences. MISO can help turn hostile elements into neutral elements and neutral elements into friendly. While not part of MISO, public affairs operations can help support the overall MISO effort.

In addition to technical means of information delivery, airpower forces possess capabilities to produce influencing effects by demonstrating superior mobility, responsiveness, and firepower. Influencing the behavior of target groups through air operations may be used to weaken enemy resistance, capture public support, or both. Influence operations may produce indirect benefits resulting from such activities as humanitarian assistance and civic assistance action.

Development and mobilization programs involving military security forces should include informational initiatives that clarify and promote government intentions. Air transportation of public information officials can provide a means of disseminating vital information, especially when undertaken in isolated areas. Public affairs operations can be an effective tool to bolster a HN’s public support for counterinsurgency operations and can increase HN government legitimacy.

As an IRC of IO, EW is conducted to secure and maintain freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Military forces rely heavily on the EMS to sense, communicate, strike, and dominate offensively and defensively across all warfighting domains. EW is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS. EW consists of three divisions: electromagnetic attack, electromagnetic warfare support, and electromagnetic protection. All three contribute to the success of air, space, and cyberspace operations. Employing EW offers commanders both lethal and nonlethal options.

Employed across the entire continuum of competition and conflict, EW can enhance the ability of operational commanders to achieve advantage over adversaries. Commanders rely on the EMS for intelligence; communication; positioning, navigation, and timing; sensing; command and control; attack; ranging; data transmission; and information and storage. Therefore, control of the EMS is essential to the success of military operations across the competition continuum. EW considerations must be fully integrated into operations in order to be effective.

Cyberspace operations capabilities provide an indirect or direct combat role to support or extend lethal and nonlethal effects and can provide defense in-depth options in the
face of increased probing and attempted intrusion or attack of coalition networks. Counterintelligence activities in cyberspace can identify, disrupt, neutralize, penetrate, or exploit the adversary’s activities, threats or plans, or use it as a conduit to achieve some effect. Cyberspace plans and operational considerations are important to integrate into US FID operations.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) offer extended military capabilities and tailored options providing great flexibility, stealth, surgical execution, speed, and surprise. AFSOF aviation is inherently offensive in nature and is especially useful in situations where conventional solutions are not effective against insurgent and terrorist threats. The development and maintenance of AFSOF aviation is particularly important to countries that must deal with such internal asymmetric threats as guerrilla insurgency, terrorism, criminal subversion, and illicit drug production and trafficking.

AFSOF aviation should be primarily organized, trained, and equipped to support special operations surface forces in hostile, denied, or other politically sensitive territory with air mobility and resupply, insertion and extraction, personnel recovery, ISR, and CAS. AFSOF aviation should enable surface forces to conduct small-unit tactical operations in territory that cannot be accessed or occupied by conventional forces. Whereas many foreign nations possess surface special operations units, few possess special operations aviation assets. Where needed, indigenous aviation forces may find it expedient to organize, train, and equip to support ground special operations surface forces in hostile, denied, or other politically sensitive territory with air mobility and resupply, insertion and extraction, CASEVAC, PR, ISR, and CAS. As with US forces, indigenous capabilities should be adaptive, fluid, and responsive to asymmetric threats and circumstances. For additional information, see Annex 3-05, *Special Operations*.
Foreign internal defense (FID) operations are divided into three major categories—indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations. Although various capabilities, programs, and activities within these categories may occur simultaneously, the categories themselves represent significantly different levels of Air Force involvement. They also indicate the range of Air Force FID options available within a given situation.

Airpower functions as a force multiplier in countering subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (including terrorism) by increasing the survivability and effectiveness of internal security activities. However, government success is not directly related to the variable of time. A government that can provide adequate services and is slowly reducing violence may succeed, while a government that achieves a quick military victory, but fails to make fundamental reforms to address the sources of an insurgency may fail over the long term. Nonetheless, early Air Force activities to develop or improve host nation (HN) capabilities also reduce the need for higher forms of direct support or intervention.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR FORCE FID OPERATIONS

Air Force FID operations support US response measures that, according to the principles of international and domestic law, affirm the right of states to assist one another in maintaining internal order against insurgency and other forms of internal violence. Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law support the host government’s inherent right of self-defense. The UN charter also recognizes, through the right of collective self-defense, that targets of aggression may request assistance, to include armed assistance, from other states.

FID operations take place within the larger context of US strategies for shaping and influencing the operational environment. Normally, the Air Force will conduct FID operations when the President or Secretary of State honors a HN request for military assistance and Air Force forces have been directed to do so by appropriate legal authorities. The decision to conduct FID operations is based on US and international
laws, however, the culture and norms of the affected nation influence how the operation is conducted. The US may assist HNs and, in some cases, may directly intervene. Operations should be tied to specific objectives and may be conducted over extended periods. All stability operations, regardless of context, require an exit strategy that leaves a legitimate government in place with sufficient capacity to address insurgency and other internal threats.

**Integrated Interagency Objectives**

The first requirement for Air Force FID operations is to ensure that commanders clearly articulate military objectives based on HN and US objectives. Air Force FID activities should be sensitive to HN needs while integrating with plans and operations of other participating departments, executive agencies, and US government organizations. Commanders should structure the FID effort to fit the requirements of the operation. FID efforts need to function together coherently within the FID continuum.

Commanders should ensure that Air Force FID-related security assistance efforts and direct support operations function as integrated elements of the overall US FID effort. **Air Force commanders and their assigned or attached forces should be prepared to function as part of a joint-interagency team with mutually supporting programs and objectives.** Relationships should be clearly defined between various command agencies. Air Force FID activities will often fall under the purview of non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies.

Implementing FID involves a wide range of responses by various agencies, departments, and independent establishments of the US Government plus many **non-governmental organizations**. These multi-agency operations involve all instruments of national power as well as participation with the international humanitarian and reconstruction community, to support major combat actions if necessary; establish internal security; facilitate reconciliation among local adversaries; help establish political, social, and economic infrastructures; and facilitate HN defense initiatives.

**THE FID CONTINUUM**

The objective of Air Force FID operations is to encourage and support host-nation solutions to subversion, insurgency, lawlessness, and terrorism, in order to reduce the possibility of direct US military involvement. Air Force support is usually applied **indirectly** through security assistance training, advisory engagements, and logistics support.

The Air Force can provide certain forms of **direct support that do not commit US forces to combat**. The Air Force can engage in combat to meet US and HN objectives. **Air Force FID operations do not automatically transition from indirect to direct forms of assistance based on any precondition or sequence of events. The transition is based on policy decisions made by the appropriate, legally empowered authorities.**
If direct support is required, the level and type of assistance should be appropriate to the situation and should preserve or increase HN strength and responsibility for self-defense. Direct support should be withdrawn as soon as possible, consistent with HN needs and capabilities. Tailored Air Force teams can assess, train, advise, assist, and integrate (into multinational or joint operations) HN aviation forces in employment and sustainment at all three levels of US support.

The Air Force FID capabilities help commanders develop appropriate options to support US objectives and tailor to HN airpower needs and capabilities. The air component may be simultaneously operating in all phases of FID. These capabilities fall under the three main FID categories—indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations—as illustrated in the “Continuum of Air Force FID” figure, above.

### Indirect Support

Indirect support emphasizes Air Force efforts to develop and sustain HN self-sufficiency and is often associated with steady-state shaping strategies. Security assistance, supplemented by joint and multinational exercises and other joint initiatives, constitutes the primary Air Force contribution to indirect support FID operations.

The Air Force Global Partnership Strategy defines Air Force security cooperation efforts, and security assistance is one of the tools available for FID operations. The principal objective of security assistance in FID is to establish secure environments in which foreign governments can pursue social, economic, and political initiatives to

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The Continuum of Air Force FID

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<tr>
<th>Indirect Support</th>
<th>Direct Support (not involving combat)</th>
<th>Direct Support (combat operations)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Security assistance</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
<td>Combat support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint and multinational exercises</td>
<td>Civil-military operations</td>
<td>Combat operations (includes activities in other boxes)</td>
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<td>Exchange programs</td>
<td>Air mobility</td>
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<td>Trainers and advisors</td>
<td>Combat support capabilities</td>
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<td>Aerial photography and cartography</td>
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<td>Weather support operations</td>
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<td>Counter-drug activities</td>
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relieve tensions in their nations and to prevent insurgent or terrorist organizations from establishing a safe haven. Although security assistance encompasses more than FID, it is a component inherent in other FID operations such as logistics, training, and advisory support.

Air Force security assistance efforts should focus on defense equipment and services that reduce foreign security force dependency on in-country supervision and support by the United States. Recipient nations’ personnel should be trained to operate and maintain the systems provided. In some cases, they should also be shown how to employ these systems for specific operations. As HN proficiency in air operations improves, developing internal training capabilities within host-aviation units can reduce dependence on in-country Air Force assistance. To overcome sustainability problems inherent in maintaining older generation aircraft and systems, Air Force security assistance operations may also include administration and logistics support of nonstandard items.

The Department of State has the overall responsibility for military and economic security assistance. The DOD administers the military assistance portion, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The Air Force is responsible, as an implementing agency, for those security assistance programs assigned by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Of the several security assistance programs involving the Air Force, the main programs typically include mobile training teams, foreign military financing, and international military education and training. See the Air Force Global Partnership Strategy for types of security assistance.

**Direct Support Not Involving Combat**

When it is impractical for the host air force to develop self-sufficiency in time to counter a threat, the Air Force may be tasked to provide direct support that does not commit US personnel to combat. Such support encompasses service-funded activities that improve host air force effectiveness without duplicating or replacing security assistance efforts to create or maintain HN capabilities. Air Force activities at this level normally focus on civil-military operations (CMO) support, intelligence collection and analysis, counterintelligence activities, logistics support, and other “stand-off” support functions.

Air Force intelligence resources, in conjunction with country team and theater programs and activities, can support host-nation internal defense and development (IDAD) planning through long-range strategic collection and analysis. At the tactical level, Air Force technical capabilities can complement and augment host-nation collection programs. Intelligence sharing involves providing intelligence products. It does not mean transferring collection methods, sources, or technology to the HN; however, counterintelligence and law enforcement activities are typical contributions to HN IDAD.

Air Force ground, airborne, and space-based communications resources can support HN security forces by providing critical command and control (C2) capabilities. The Air Force can also provide missile warning, environmental monitoring, positioning,
navigation, and timing support where HN resources are lacking. Such support may include HN use of US communication assets, but it does not involve the transfer of communications systems or technology to the HN. The Air Force maintains control of systems employed in the direct support role and ensures protection of classified communications and computer technology.

Air Force forces and capabilities can support CMO. CMO are a broad area addressing the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the population and are employed to develop favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. The three components of CMO include civil-military relations, enabling operations, and information management. Although the Air Force does not possess civil affairs (CA) units, Air Force resources can provide support to joint US civil affairs operations through air mobility and contingency response element support, communications backup, information broadcasting, and technical advice on airpower operations.

The effects of airpower to influence behavior can be employed to further FID objectives through shows of strength and overt demonstrations of support to friends and allies. Specific, stand-alone military information support operations (MISO) capabilities can be used to support the dissemination of host government informational programs. Aircraft can dispense leaflets or conduct MISO broadcasting over standard radio, television, short wave, and military communications bands.

With appropriate authorization and direction, the Air Force can undertake Humanitarian Assistance (HA) independent of joint or multinational exercises, or other military operations. Air Force capabilities for HA include personnel evacuation, air mobility, and medical support for disaster victims. Aerial platforms can also support relief activities by broadcasting evacuation instructions and other public information and by temporarily replacing or expanding coverage of existing ground transmitters.

Whereas HA focuses on emergency transportation support and other support to alleviate urgent host-nation needs caused by natural disasters and catastrophes, humanitarian and civil assistance (HCA) activities are planned in advance and carried out in conjunction with military operations and exercises. Appendix B contains more detailed information on HCA.

Military civic action (MCA) can be undertaken along with security assistance training or as part of traditional theater activities. MCA is essentially a US military-to-HN military program involving projects undertaken by primarily indigenous forces. Examples include construction, health care, and agriculture projects. Air Force support of MCA is generally limited to training and advisory assistance.

The Air Force provides critical ISR capabilities as part of direct support FID. Maps of developing nations often lack sufficient scale and definition for planning and executing exercises and tactical operations. Air Force capability in this area can also be used for testing and evaluating mutual intelligence analysis techniques and
procedures. A supply of photographs and maps for HN personnel in quantities larger than that consumed in exercises usually requires security assistance funding.

Air Force meteorological reporting, analysis, forecasting, and interpretation can be employed as part of the direct support effort to enhance HN IDAD initiatives. Interpretation of weather data for local effects (rainfall, flooding, wind, visibility, etc.) can be used in an MCA role or applied to host-military planning activities.

Air mobility is crucial to FID direct support operations. Air mobility can be used for delivery, recovery, and resupply of US defense equipment and services, returning items to the US for repair, transporting HN personnel to out-of-country training locations, and providing aeromedical evacuation from main operating bases in the HN.

Air Force resources may be used to support counterdrug activities in countries receiving FID assistance. Such activities may include intercept of aircraft, vessels, or vehicles for communications purposes, gathering and processing tactical intelligence from a variety of sources (including fixed and mobile surveillance assets), and intelligence sharing.

The Air Force may offer certain types of direct support to host-nation counterdrug personnel when authorized by DOD policy and legislative guidance. Air Force resources may also support US civilian law enforcement agencies and to the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in the conduct of counterdrug operations. Combatant commanders direct their components’ execution of counterdrug activities within their geographic areas of responsibility.

Counterdrug activities, may involve Air Force capabilities like intelligence sharing; law enforcement and counterintelligence activities; meteorological services; aerial reconnaissance and mapping; air mobility of personnel, supplies and equipment; communications support; counterdrug training; upgrading and maintenance of equipment; and establishing and operating bases or training sites that facilitate counterdrug activities. US forces are prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activities without and Air Force nexus unless directed by the President of the United States or Secretary of Defense.

**Combat Operations**

Given appropriate authorities, Air Force personnel can conduct joint/multinational combat operations in the host country. Air Force assets can provide air mobility for both US and host-nation forces. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, attack, and forward air control assets provide capabilities in support of US and host ground and maritime forces. Air Force electromagnetic warfare platforms can also provide support, including communications jamming.
Specific command and control (C2) systems and processes for indirect and direct support vary according to the conflict situation, host nation (HN) requirements, US objectives, and the level of US involvement. C2 systems and processes for security assistance and most forms of direct support (not involving combat) contain civilian as well as military elements. Nongovernmental organizations and commercial consortia can provide much of the C2 infrastructure that enables foreign internal defense (FID) operations. Air Force security assistance activities overseas are organized under a military command structure within security assistance offices, but both civilian and military elements control and supervise aspects of these activities. Military authorities command, control, and supervise tactical operations in the field.

Security cooperation organizations (SCOs) respond to two channels: one through the US diplomatic mission and the other through the geographic combatant commander (GCC). All US government personnel performing security assistance duties in a foreign country are under the policy direction and supervision of the US chief of mission. Commanders and senior officers assigned to SCO positions in foreign countries should be given special training that defines the limits of “policy direction and supervision” and appropriate reporting instructions in military channels when guidance may not be consistent with Department of Defense (DOD) policy.

C2 INDIRECT SUPPORT

The Air Force conducts indirect support in accordance with the guidance contained in statutory authorities and executive orders, as well as directives, regulations, and manuals issued by the Department of State (DOS) and the DOD. Military personnel temporarily assigned within a foreign nation serve under the policy direction, coordination, and supervision of the chief of mission, unless deployed to perform duties directed by the GCC. Forces temporarily deployed overseas to accomplish security assistance functions within a combatant commander’s AOR should normally be attached to that commander. The supported GCC normally exercises operational control of these forces.

Security assistance-funded mobile training teams (MTT) accomplish tasks and
objectives established in security assistance case letters of offer and acceptance by the DOS, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the security assistance community, rather than a GCC or special operations command. MTTs fall under security assistance case management and oversight of the security cooperation organization, or US Military Group, in the American Embassy. The MTT carries out contractual functions with a training “product” at the end. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) MTT deployments, however, should be coordinated with the theater special operations component (TSOC) personnel to advise them of the team's presence in the area of responsibility (AOR). Air Force teams deployed temporarily for training events and exercises with HN forces normally fall under the policy supervision and oversight of the American Embassy, generally through the SCO. Temporarily deployed teams should be supported by the SCO for in-country administrative functions (including appropriate technical, legal, and administrative status in the HN). The combatant commander and the US chief of mission provide procedural guidance.

C2 DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT)

Direct FID support (not involving combat) is authorized and directed on a case-by-case basis by the President or Secretary of Defense. Direct FID support is classified as a military mission with respect to command and control responsibilities of the combatant commander in whose AOR the operation is conducted.

Deployed Air Force special operations trainers and advisors are normally assigned to the TSOC commander. The joint force air component commander, through the GCC and the US Special Operations Command, can also request and employ Air Force SOF trainers and advisors. Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, §322, “Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign forces,” allows such units as AFSOC’s combat aviation advisors (CAA) to expend unit operation and maintenance funds to train (and train with) foreign forces. This legal provision gives Air Force special operations forces greater flexibility than other FID and military coalition support activities. Their inherent flexibility makes CAA forces a very attractive and cost-effective way for the US to establish important foreign relationships.

The US chief of mission can request certain forms of indirect and direct support, and it is generally subject to his or her approval. Coordination of mission requirements, operational constraints, and tasking should take place with the joint force commander or other designated agencies of the joint command. The ambassador normally exercises in-country policy supervision and oversight of these activities.

C2 DIRECT SUPPORT (COMBAT OPERATIONS)

Air Force forces employed in combat FID operations should be organized, commanded, and controlled on the basis of guidance established in joint and Air Force doctrine and directives. C2 structures may require tailoring to fit specific operational environments, force allocations, and US-HN agreements on command of multinational forces.
When deployed, Air Force special operations forces are normally attached to a joint task force as part of a subordinate joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commanded by a joint force special operations component commander. However, AFSOC personnel performing FID missions may be attached directly to a conventional air expeditionary task force (AETF) under a commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). If FID operations expand into larger combat operations, these AFSOC forces may either remain part of the AETF or be reorganized as part of the JSOTF. COMAFFORs and participants should be prepared for either command relationship.

UNIFIED ACTION

Where the responsibilities of military, governmental and nongovernmental entities overlap, planning and execution of FID initiatives require emphasis on close, continuous coordination rather than on command and control as defined in purely military terms. In many cases, the relationship between agencies is one of interdependence. Combatant commanders, for instance, have functions and responsibilities that go beyond security assistance.

SCOs and country teams, with their knowledge of security assistance activities and other foreign aid efforts, serve the combatant commander as important sources of information on HN internal defense and development planning and military preparedness. In addition, combatant commanders have contingency plans and intelligence at their disposal that may be relevant to security assistance planning and crisis response. These commanders also have assigned forces, TDY personnel, strategic expertise, and materiel resources that can be used in HN relations, security assistance, joint-multinational exercises, and certain forms of direct support. Combatant commanders can also promote interoperability and standardization for multinational operations involving US and HN forces.

Coordination tailored to specific locations and missions benefits not only US diplomatic mission objectives but also the combatant commander’s security assistance mission. For example, Air Force elements assigned to combatant commands and SCOs (or other country team components) support joint-interagency coordination of airpower requirements and capabilities for security assistance planning, administration, logistics support, and direct support operations. To accomplish such coordination, Air Force representatives may choose to use an appropriate channel of communication that may extend outside formal coordination procedures. These channels can be used to support combatant commander efforts to help SCOs develop realistic air defense requirements in host countries. They can also be used to keep US diplomatic missions informed about airpower resources and capabilities available for direct support and crisis response.

Joint and Interagency Operations

FID operations frequently involve joint and interagency efforts supporting unified action.
Success of these operations depends on effective communications for tasking, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting among the various US civilian and military agencies. Air Force C2 structures should be tailored to specific environments, missions, and joint force compositions and should be adaptable to varying scenarios. These structures should connect in-country, joint, and interagency elements and should establish links between in-country elements, the combatant commander, and US command and supervisory elements. Deployed Air Force teams may function as elements attached to other Service units or attached, under special arrangements, to interagency organizations.

**Multinational Operations**

Air Force elements play a key FID role by helping to develop and support multinational C2 capabilities for airpower operations. Multinational (combined) activity is inherent in all forms of military FID assistance, and all these forms require links between US and HN C2 elements. Command relationships and responsibilities for multinational exercises and contingency operations are established in accordance with US-HN agreements.

Connectivity is essential, particularly when US and HN forces function in mutual support during combat operations. Interoperability issues should also be considered in light of the Air Force’s need for information assurance.

Significant C2 interoperability challenges in multinational operations typically involve incompatible equipment and standards, language barriers, differing C2 procedures, lack of HN experience, and inadequate HN logistics infrastructures to maintain modern communications equipment. Equipment modernization provided under security assistance can alleviate some of these deficiencies, but commanders should also consider the use of Air Force trainers and advisors to improve HN C2 doctrine, coordinate combined C2 procedures, and facilitate interoperability.
PLANNING FOR FID OPERATIONS

Last Updated: 1 February 2020

Foreign internal defense (FID) planning should be incorporated into theater security cooperation plans, strategies, theater campaign plans, and FID contingency actions. FID planning should account for the Air Force Global Partnership Strategy. The FID plan defines objectives pursuant to national strategy and provides subordinate commanders with general force employment guidance. A combatant commander bases force employment guidance on an assessment of employment opportunities and an analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of friendly and hostile forces.

FID plans provide joint forces a concept of operations and establish resource requirements, priorities, channels of communication, and basing modes. Plans for indirect and direct support are extensions of theater strategy, but vary in purpose and execution. FID operations can be planned and carried out independent of US military actions, performed in conjunction with major joint and multinational actions, or carried out following major campaigns aimed at securing specific military objectives.

PLANNING INDIRECT SUPPORT

The principal function of US military indirect FID assistance is to secure US strategic interests. Planning should be directed at specific combat support capabilities like aircraft maintenance, fuels, and training; as well as advisory help to create and sustain host nation (HN) military capabilities. HN military commanders carry out force deployment, employment, and the orchestration of tactical events to accomplish objectives established in the HN internal defense and development (IDAD) plan.

Joint planning for indirect FID assistance should guide US military commanders and other agencies charged with security assistance and joint-multipurpose exercise responsibilities. These plans for indirect FID assistance serve US strategic interests by supporting HN IDAD programs where such assistance is politically feasible, legally permissible, strategically sound, and logistically supportable.
PLANNING DIRECT SUPPORT

Direct-support planning for FID primarily involves the employment and logistical support of US forces. Direct-support planning guides US military activities and concurrently complements and supports HN IDAD programs. Direct-support planning does not normally include training and equipment transfers to the HN, though it may include combat advisors to help HN forces execute tactical operations and keep them connected to multinational joint forces at the tactical level. Airpower priorities and tasks established in the plan involve the allocation and apportionment of Air Force aircraft, aircrews, and support resources. Planning may include mobility and employment considerations for allied foreign forces when multinational operations are involved.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

Air Force FID planning requires a clear statement of airpower objectives in the HN, specifically, what major role (or roles) airpower should play and what that role should accomplish in furthering the HN’s IDAD strategy. These objectives, derived from priorities contained in the IDAD plan, should function as the basis for planning various forms of airpower support to the host government. Air Force planners need to be involved in the FID planning process in order to account for Air Force capabilities to create desired effects.

Operational-level airpower planning for FID generally requires extensive cooperation and coordination within the joint, multinational, and interagency arenas. In most cases, combatant commanders and their staffs function as focal points for coordinating indirect as well as direct forms of assistance. In many cases, the planning process requires the direct participation of the supported government and its military forces. Requirements for effective FID planning include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following list.

- Plans establishing guidance and objectives for all types of direct and indirect support should be compatible with host-government IDAD initiatives.

- Planning should determine airpower tools appropriate to the operational environment and local conditions, for example, transferring available air platforms to the HN that fit within the technological and financial resources of that nation.

- Air Force FID planning should be flexible. Periodic revisions may be necessary to accommodate alterations in HN planning, unanticipated restrictions on US assistance, and significant shifts in conflict intensity and levels of US support.

- Air Force FID planning should be conducted jointly, or, where appropriate, coordinated with joint US military components and with US civilian agencies exercising control, supervision, and oversight of FID activities in the recipient nation.
All forms of direct and indirect FID support are coordinated with, and approved by, the HN. In most cases, the planning process requires direct participation by the host government and its military forces. Joint and multinational planning gives participants a means to negotiate and agree on such issues as mission objectives, force levels, composition of forces, support arrangements, command and control relationships, and rules of engagement.

Air Force FID planning should be carried out according to US procurement and security assistance law. Allowable FID activities vary within the US government, the Department of Defense, and the Air Force. To ensure compliance with legislative constraints and funding procedures, FID planners should involve knowledgeable judge advocates early and often in the planning process.
Planning for foreign internal defense (FID) operations, as with all contingency actions, starts with an analysis of critical capabilities and vulnerabilities of both friendly and adversary forces. This allows planners to determine appropriate courses of action for employing airpower. Much of the combat support (CS) and deployment planning for FID operations can be undertaken using standard planning techniques and procedures. The failure to incorporate CS in planning future operations may result in the inability to adequately support and sustain selected courses of action. Employment planning for asymmetric engagement and certain types of foreign training and advisory actions, however, may require a different approach or operational design.

Mission analysis may indicate the most direct approach to meeting desired end states requires leveraging host nation (HN) civil and military capabilities. That determination may, in turn, lead to the conclusion that the desired course of action should achieve the end state through enabling HN forces to defend their own territory from internal threats. The air planner’s operational design is then structured around achieving strategic aims by working with a HN’s aviation forces.

The air planner should address key questions that lead to an understanding (or estimate) of airpower roles and missions as well as required organizational structures, command and control capabilities, training programs, tactical resources, etc. The primary focus of planning should focus on the internal threats to HN national security and how to counter those threats within that nation’s financial and technological resources, specifically, what priorities are assigned to countering these threats.
Once threats are identified and assigned priorities planners should consider how the host nation (HN) government can employ and integrate its political, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power to counter the threats. The goal is to specify the ends (desired results), the ways (methods), and the means (actual resources) to achieve national security objectives, thus helping the HN develop its internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy. The following illustrates this focused, integrated scheme.

The ends (desired result) may be to:

- Prevent insurgent or terrorist incursions throughout the country’s interior and across its borders from a neighboring country.

The ways (method) may be to:

- Launch counterintelligence ventures with HN to establish a credible network to identify, disrupt, neutralize, penetrate, or exploit the insurgent’s activities, threats or plans.

- Launch an information campaign designed to turn international opinion against the insurgents.

- Invest money in training, education, and medical programs to improve living conditions and psychological resistance in affected areas of the country.

- Implement political reforms throughout the country to mobilize public support of the government.

- Mount a military response to the insurgent threat and enforce, underscore, and protect HN economic and political initiatives.

The means (actual resources) may include:
The local and national media broadcast the government’s message to the world.

The country’s financial reserves derived from product exports, taxes, etc.

Legal actions carried out to implement political reforms.

Personnel and material resources of the nation’s armed forces.

Next, planners should determine what the roles (purpose and function) of military force are: what tasks the military performs to meet HN national strategic needs and goals, and how airpower supports this effort. Planners should assign priorities to airpower missions. Finally, they should determine what airpower the HN possesses to accomplish these missions and what resources are required through foreign internal defense (FID) efforts to make HN aviation forces capable of meeting the operational requirements. This requires an airpower assessment conducted by a qualified Air Force assessment team.

After determining how airpower will support the national security and military strategy; it is possible to establish requirements, priorities, goals, and physical parameters for recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and employing HN military aviation forces. This includes major end items and training the US might furnish the HN government under an enablement strategy. These requirements, priorities, and goals establish the basis for formulating what higher echelons of HN military command should do, or be capable of doing, to enable operational effectiveness and support national strategy.

The planner can now build a FID plan with a concept of operations that includes estimated timelines with phased initiatives, goals, and objectives for US actions. The FID plan can be reconciled and adjusted in accordance with the HN’s IDAD strategy. The FID plan gives commanders a starting point for initiating appropriate actions.
Although the most desirable foreign internal defense (FID) course of action is often through indirect support, minimizing US presence and participation, analysis may show that host nation (HN) aviation forces alone cannot prevail under the timelines and conditions required to bring their units up to operational status. The operational design and resulting plan may require that Air Force airpower be introduced in combination with enabling FID initiatives aimed at helping the HN counter, survive, and prevail against a threat to internal stability. When FID actions involve the direct use of Air Force forces, there is a critical sequence of initiatives to incorporate into the planning process:

- Air Force direct support operations are carried out in accordance with the joint force commander’s guidance and performed in concert with other joint and multinational military forces and civilian agencies.

- HN airpower is supported through training, advising, assisting, and material support. HN airpower should become functional as soon as practical and, where possible, be applied simultaneously with the Air Force direct support effort.

- Air Force advisors facilitate multinational operations with HN forces followed by a transition to a HN-only, joint battlefield.

- Air Force direct-support forces and operations are phased out of the campaign or contingency.

- The Air Force supports HN air operations with ongoing sustainment initiatives, including specific combat support capabilities and advisory assistance, until the HN attains a successful conclusion to the conflict.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID)

The internal dynamics of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and other forms of internal conflict vary with each situation, FID planning should begin with an analysis of the operational environment. Intelligence requirements are based on the commander’s information needs and can include risk assessments, analyses of friendly and enemy forces and infrastructures, endemic health threats to deployed personnel, situation reporting, and targeting data. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is a major source of information for FID planning and execution, and counterintelligence resources can be deployed to exploit and neutralize threats received through HUMINT collection.

HUMINT derives from conflict and crisis backgrounds such as historical analysis and cultural factors; social, economic, and political components of the conflict; and the personalities and ambitions of the key players. Early intelligence estimates provide a foundation for establishing proper correlation and priorities among military and nonmilitary airpower roles for both the host nation (HN) and Air Force FID forces. Early assessments derived from basic and estimative intelligence also increase a HN’s chances to counter the insurgent or terrorist threat with the least amount of force.

The key to effective employment of US intelligence is early development of essential elements of information (EEIs) by combatant commanders, air component commanders, and intelligence analysts. In all cases, it is essential that commanders understand the operational environment well enough to accurately determine the EEIs for intelligence planning and execution. Commanders should have access to regional area specialists to help develop EEIs. EEIs should be translated into collection requirements for intelligence collection processes, resources, and methodologies.

If an insurgency progresses to the point where intelligence activities are reduced to crisis reporting, non-military options are severely limited. At the crisis stage, the EEIs focus primarily on how large the enemy force is, what its capabilities and intent are, where it is located, and how it can be destroyed. During the early incipient phase, the
questions shift from what and where to who and why. Knowing the answers to this last set of questions allows defenders to address the insurgency, not just the insurgent. Counterintelligence activities can be most effective during this stage to maximize the involvement and participation from HN law enforcement, intelligence, and security agencies to counter the insurgency and to monitor the situation on the ground in the area of responsibility.

**SPACE SUPPORT TO FID**

*Space support* should be integrated into FID at all stages of engagement. Space systems and personnel, for example, provide commanders with *intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance* (ISR) support; *command and control* (C2) support; and *position, navigation, and timing* (PNT) services. Proper command relationships, normally *direct liaison authorized* (DIRLAUTH), should be established between in-country teams and national agencies, such as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. Those relationships allow in-country teams’ access to timely intelligence data and analysis.

Long-haul and over-the-horizon communication systems are vitally important for FID teams operating in austere locations. These teams should have access to the regional *satellite communications* (SATCOM) support centers for the areas in which they operate to provide them SATCOM capabilities. Similarly, DIRLAUTH, with the mission management center for blue-force tracking (BFT), allows proper management and use of BFT capabilities.

Many space capabilities and services can be shared with HN forces. Air Force FID planners should take appropriate measures to ensure that security and classification guidelines are in place and followed.

DIRLAUTH with the space *air operations center* (AOC) or the *Combined Space Operations Center* (CSpOC) allows in-country FID teams’ access to Department of Defense (DOD) space support. The space AOC / CSpOC can also request and coordinate reachback to many non-Department of Defense (DOD) space service providers that offer non-DOD, foreign, and commercial space support. The space AOC / CSpOC provides connectivity to many space-service providers that offer ISR, SATCOM, and PNT capabilities. Depending on where the FID effort is taking place, the HN will often have better relations with foreign-service providers than the United States. In those cases, the FID team should provide the HN with information that will enable them to request services directly from sources that may not want to support US efforts.

**CYBERSPACE SUPPORT TO FID**

Cyberspace support should be integrated into US forces FID planning and activities at all levels of indirect and direct support operations. Cyberspace operations are key force

**MEDICAL SUPPORT TO FID**

Health issues contribute to irregular warfare struggles for legitimacy and influence, and Air Force medical service professionals routinely operate in humanitarian and civic assistance, security assistance, and FID programs. Medical support can uniquely help FID operations establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve combined integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional cooperation. Therefore, medical support options and personnel should be included in FID planning and operations.

Air Force International Health Specialist (IHS) professionals are trained to support the full continuum of Air Force FID activities and assist joint force commanders and the commander, Air Force forces achieve objectives and end-states through health-related engagements which foster rapport, understanding, interoperability, and a more effective health infrastructure. Similar to regional area specialists, IHS professionals are proficient in regional cultures and often foreign languages.

**COMBAT SUPPORT CAPABILITIES**

*Combat Support* (CS) elements play a dominant role in security assistance and form the backbone of indirect Air Force FID assistance. Air Force CS elements also support US force deployment and specific joint and multinational operations in more direct forms of support. Information developed by Air Force CS elements through site surveys, joint and multinational exercises, CS studies, and other assessments supporting security assistance activities may contain significant information for planners. A key step in CS planning is to understand HN internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy and define its aviation requirements and capabilities.

The HN’s IDAD strategy should be understood and its aviation requirements and capabilities defined before detailed CS planning commences. Accordingly, CS planning for significant force structure improvements should focus initially on what the HN intends to do, or can do, for itself. Specifically:

- How the host government intends to employ its national resources to reach its IDAD goals.
- What immediate and long-range priorities are assigned to the IDAD strategy.
- How the HN intends to employ airpower to support both military and nonmilitary objectives contained in the overall strategy.
What the host-nation's capacity is to receive, store, operate, and maintain both present and projected air, space, and information resources.

Resource priorities should align with objectives identified in the IDAD plan, along with strategy-to-task FID planning. CS planning should take into account the limited logistics infrastructures often prevalent in developing nations and consider social, economic, and political factors that could enhance or impede Air Force CS operations.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Military information support operations (MISO) and FID operations can be complementary and produce synergistic effects. MISO considerations and planning should be included in all FID activities, even when those activities are not primarily designed to achieve influential effects. Operations and logistics planners at all levels of command should carefully consider the psychological implications of any Air Force action involving direct or indirect support to a foreign government. Accordingly, MISO planning should be closely tied to all-source intelligence on friendly and hostile elements. FID planners should also anticipate enemy information operations directed at Air Force operations in the HN and use MISO to maximize the positive effects of Air Force activities in support of the HN. Operations likely to generate counterpropaganda operations requirements should be coordinated with appropriate US and HN public affairs and information agencies.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

In some circumstances, US Army or Marine Corps civil affairs (CA) augmentation teams may support Air Force elements deployed overseas on FID operations. FID planners should identify requirements for CA support early in the planning process. CA teams can assist in preparing overseas bases and facilities by securing local acceptance and support of Air Force operations. CA teams can also assist deployed Air Force forces by providing information on local civilian attitudes, culture, religions, ethics, infrastructure, and conflict dynamics in the area of operations. CA teams can also coordinate Air Force humanitarian and civic assistance and civic action programs and help HN authorities secure the cooperation and support of their own citizens.
Air Force foreign internal defense (FID) primarily entails airpower enablement, i.e., helping foreign aviation forces employ, sustain, and defend their resources at required levels of capability. US and supported allied commanders practice the principle of unity of command, create economy of force, and use maneuver to achieve desired objectives.

As with their US counterparts, allied and partner commanders should employ airpower forces as mutually supporting, integrated systems capable of functioning synergistically with surface operations. Air Force commanders should tailor their own FID efforts to specific conflict situations, objectives, and priorities. Direct and indirect efforts should be mutually supporting and integrated with defense and employment efforts on the ground.

Air Force units routinely conduct FID operations as an integral part of the overall military assistance effort the US extends to selected foreign governments. The delivery of US defense articles and services, in the form of major weapon systems, spare parts, maintenance support items, and training provided under security assistance are examples. Although the US aviation role can be extensive, the term “aviation FID” generally refers to Department of Defense programs for assessing, training, advising, and assisting host nation (HN) aviation forces in the sustained use of airpower to help their governments deal with internal threats.

Whether FID operations are conducted by special operations forces, conventional forces, or both, is dependent on political sensitivity to the strategic environment and the needs of the particular HN. Protracted FID efforts may require forces to know how to operate by, with, and through indigenous forces to reach end goals. Operating by, with, and through the personnel and aviation resources of another air force is a crucial skill to meet the demands of the modern asymmetric battlefield.

During extended counterinsurgency operations, Air Force commanders should be prepared to play an important role in identifying and introducing to foreign aviation forces aircraft types and capabilities, as well as airpower operational functions, combat support resources, information, and technology specifically suited to the
needs and capabilities of a lesser-developed HN. Commanders may be required to help foreign aviation forces fly and maintain aircraft that are non-standard to the US Air Force inventory.

FID-provided training includes development of basic skills in flight operations; personnel recovery, including survival, evasion, resistance, and escape skills; logistics; force protection; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; weather; health services; and other support functions. More advanced specialized training should be used to provide foreign personnel a means of applying these basic skills to specific problems affecting internal security in their countries. Such training directly supports internal, HN solutions to the conflict, thus decreasing the likelihood of a larger US military role. Where practical, tactical and operational-level training should be conducted jointly. Joint training offers major advantages in developing common understandings among host-military services of requirements, capabilities, limitations, and procedures. Multinational participation lays the groundwork for future contacts between US and HN personnel by establishing mutual understanding of FID-internal defense and development requirements and objectives.
The geopolitical environment and US force structure reductions have increased US reliance on host nations’ (HNs’) ability to defend themselves and function as viable coalition partners. There is increased emphasis by planners and joint force commanders on creating multinational as well as joint battlefields. That task, which involves facilitating the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of foreign forces, will fall to US military trainers and advisors.

The air advisor is the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) most immediate point of contact with foreign counterparts and coalition forces. Air Force training and advisory personnel most often represent the airpower component of this overall advisory effort.

The size and composition of US military training and advisory teams should be sufficient to address the major deficiencies that affect the host air force. Trainers and advisors should also be able to recognize potential airpower applications in a given internal conflict. Trainers and advisors should understand the various elements of combat support as well as their application and interdependence when conducting foreign internal defense (FID). They should understand the means and possible limitations of integrating airpower operations into the HN social, economic, psychological, political, and joint military initiatives.

Trainers and advisors exert a major influence on foreign counterpart forces. They help the JFC bring foreign forces into contingency planning as force multipliers and help keep coalitions connected at the tactical level by engaging foreign forces in tactical environments. This task includes advising foreign aviation units in both airpower applications and airpower sustainment methods supporting joint and multinational objectives.

The assess-train-advise-assist mission set can be performed at any level of FID: indirect support, direct support not including combat, and combat operations. Air Force FID assistance to foreign governments conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) is referred to as “support for counterinsurgency.”

Aviation FID operations primarily involve support to HN COIN, combating terrorism,
and counter-narcotics programs. Aviation FID nominally functions as a complement to other component operations involving ground, maritime, and riverine advisory assistance and training conducted with HN forces in various theaters of operation. In the case of FID, training and advisory operations can be employed to encourage and support HN solutions to the problems of internal subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and should be conducted as shaping operations prior to the onset of crisis or war, thus supporting the strategic goals of conflict prevention and deterrence as well as regime and regional stability.

Commanders should anticipate the types and levels of training needed by HNs to succeed in military operations to counter terrorist groups or insurgents. As an example, foreign forces engaged in counterterrorism (CT) operations should train in specific tactical actions needed to accomplish the task. This training may require foreign air force units to shift their basic tactics. It is not simply a matter of what platform to use, but how to use that platform. Air support elements also have to work closely with their surface force counterparts to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures required for combat operations against terrorist forces.

Major improvements in the air support capabilities of candidate foreign aviation forces may be required to achieve “mission-ready” COIN or CT status. Foreign forces need to be able to generate and apply detailed intelligence in the air support mission planning and execution processes. It also means transitioning from day or night, point-to-point visual flight rules navigation in relatively benign environments to night, low-level navigation into remote, hostile locations using night vision goggles.
A variety of personnel throughout the Air Force can accomplish the assess, train, advise, and assist mission set; however, the need for these skills worldwide exceeds the number of specialized forces available. This is especially true in cases when training and advisory forces must maintain presence and persistence for extended periods of time. Commanders should consider all available options for enabling foreign aviation forces through foreign internal defense (FID) training and advisory initiatives.

Training and advising support is conducted at both the operational and tactical levels. When tasked, Air Force training and advisory personnel deploy to a designated country, collocate with host nation (HN) aviation elements at squadron, wing, or headquarters levels, and assess, train, advise, and assist counterpart personnel in the employment and sustainment of airpower operations.

In appropriate instances, US instructor aircrews fly with foreign counterparts at the deployment location, generally using HN aircraft, to assess capabilities and determine current levels of proficiency and safety. The instructors may then train HN aviation personnel in required tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint and combined warfare.

The mission set of assessing, training, advising, and assisting is based on critical sequencing. All training and advisory efforts involving flying should be preceded by an assessment of the airworthiness and safety of the HN unit’s aircraft and crews. The assessment is required for familiarization with HN aviation capabilities and procedures before commencement of multinational operations. It is also required as a basis for conducting risk management and for estimating possible levels of multinational interoperability.

Tactical flying training may be required to bring HN aviation forces to the point where they can be advised in airpower applications supporting campaign or air operations objectives. The basic steps in this process are sequential—assess, train, advise, assist. Commanders should issue directives or operating instructions clearly defining which steps are authorized and tasked.
Upon appropriate direction, tactically qualified aircrews may be required to fly with HN counterparts on certain critical missions to provide the needed margin of safety and reliability, especially when supporting other US or US-advised forces. To facilitate multinational air planning, aircrews also advise appropriate US command elements (based on first-hand experience) of foreign aviation capabilities and limitations. Conventional Air Force forces can be brought into such programs as security assistance-funded mobile training teams, advisory support teams, and military transition teams (MiTT) that train, advise, or simply mentor foreign aviation forces. These teams provide a means of reaching outside the special operations-oriented arena to train and advise in a broader range of airpower functions and supporting tasks for FID and counterinsurgency.

While such teams can be created for specific purposes, commanders should take appropriate steps to ensure that members deploying to overseas locations are properly trained and equipped for the task. As an example, during the late summer of 2006, 105 Air Force MiTT members were trained by Air Force Special Operations Command combat aviation advisors (CAA) forces and deployed for extended duty as embedded advisors with the Iraqi Air Force.

FID training and advising has traditionally focused on tactical flying skills and associated sustainment capabilities at the squadron and wing levels of foreign aviation units. Historically the most significant challenge during Air Force training and contingency operations involve senior HN air force leaders effectively organizing and training their forces and their inability to create regulations and operating instructions in order to establish operational boundaries. The problem affects operational-level sustainment in such areas as administration, resource programming, training, aircraft maintenance, logistics, force protection, standardization and evaluation, and certification of skills.

Commanders should seek opportunities to elevate Air Force training and advisory efforts to higher levels of HN military leadership and address such issues as basic air force infrastructure, organization, training, command and control, logistics, and procurement processes. The effort should focus on building effective foundations for a lasting and competent self-defense, rather than a temporary capability that swiftly erodes with the exodus of external support. In most cases, this larger perspective is needed before evaluating, recommending, and funding specific tactical weapon systems, technical capabilities, and training.

The task of training and advising foreign aviation forces in large-scale infrastructure changes and initiatives is a significant challenge for Air Force training and advisory personnel. Air Force special operations forces air advisor or CAA resources and skill sets do not usually include mechanisms for assisting foreign aviation forces with broad, fundamental changes to basic administrative processes and logistics infrastructures. The skills and level of experience needed to accomplish this task generally reside within the more experienced levels of the Air Force community.

The Air Force approach to foreign assistance and advisory efforts should integrate with
the joint and interagency levels. Commanders should consider ways and means to identify qualified senior-level officers and noncommissioned officers to carry out well-defined FID airpower infrastructure-building initiatives on their own.

The level of success achievable in Air Force FID operations is contingent on the training and performance of the people performing this specialized mission. Foreign area and geopolitical expertise, language ability, cultural intelligence, and advanced force protection capability are indispensable tools in the FID toolkit.

TRAINING VERSUS ADVISING

There is an important difference between training and advising. Training, a form of indirect support, can provide a doctrinal or procedural foundation for military operations and activities. Advising is a form of direct support that may or may not include combat. It involves the practical application of operational doctrine and procedures in the host country. Advising is real-world, situation-specific, and can directly implicate the US in a given HN contingency or operation. Generally, the step from training to advising crosses a critical political threshold requiring Presidential approval. Commanders should ensure that clearly-defined rules of engagement containing operational guidelines and parameters are available to tasked Air Force training and advisory personnel.

Training enables foreign aviation forces to accomplish a variety of airpower functional tasks, roles, and missions. Instructional programs impart employable capabilities ranging from technical skills, sustainment functions, and tactical flying skills to knowledge of airpower doctrine. Training includes operational planning and employment methods; combat tactics, techniques, and procedures; sustainment methods; and operational support activities including design and employment of communication structures. FID training activity tailors to fit an analysis of human factors as well as the technological and financial limitations of HNs.

Advice on airpower application is often most effective when applied at top decision-making levels within the host government. Advice on strategic matters, operational-level planning, joint operations, and the integration of multiple governmental agencies is appropriately directed at higher levels of the military command structure. In addition, advisory efforts may have a more lasting effect and can carry considerably more weight when acted upon by senior members of the host military.

Advisors should help HN commanders apply an operational-level perspective to such issues as air base planning and construction, air base defense, logistics, intelligence, command and control, and training. Field advisors should help local subordinate commanders ensure that tactical air support planning follows joint operational-level guidance and that tactical operations are properly coordinated and integrated with other military and civil activities. Field advice should focus on such issues as air base security and operability, resource conservation, munitions safety, and ground-handling procedures as well as providing technical assistance operating and maintaining US defense equipment. Advisors also should help HN air force commanders focus on the
political and psychological implications of combat operations.

Air Force advisors are often in the best position to identify requirements for additional security assistance efforts or more direct forms of support because of their close contact with in-country internal defense and development operations. When properly tasked they should coordinate US direct support activities with host authorities and help analyze and interpret US-provided intelligence.

FID ASSISTANCE

FID assistance extends the duties of Air Force trainers or advisors to directly assisting a foreign counterpart in accomplishing their technical specialty. Some examples include an Air Force maintenance technician helping a foreign counterpart maintain an aircraft or an Air Force security forces advisor directly assisting a foreign counterpart to establish and maintain base security.

Escalating from advising to assisting generally crosses a political threshold, requiring Presidential authority when the tasks are in conjunction with HN tactical operations. Assisting in the capacity of aircrew member under hostile-fire conditions is an example of combat operations in direct support of FID.

Commanders should ensure that clearly-defined rules of engagement available to Air Force training and advisory teams.
While most Air Force units can conduct foreign internal defense (FID) operations, the USAF maintains units specifically tasked with advisory functions.

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) organizes, trains, and equips a subset of air advisors known as combat aviation advisors (CAAs). CAAs are responsible for the conduct of special operations activities with, through, and by foreign aviation forces. CAA units are tasked with FID, security force assistance, and unconventional warfare (UW). CAAs maintain advisor certifications from both the USAF and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These certifications ensure that both USAF and USSOCOM-defined special operations joint interoperability standards are maintained to ensure that CAAs can quickly and reliably integrate into advisory efforts alongside US Army special operations forces (SOF), Naval Special Warfare contingents, and Marine Special Operations Command.

THE CAA OPERATIONAL AVIATION DETACHMENT

The CAA weapon system is the operational aviation detachment (OAD). The OAD is designed to integrate and operationalize a composite wing-sized partnered aviation unit into joint and combined operations. Fully mission capable OADs can consist of the following and are tailororable to the mission:

- Mission Commander / officer in charge.
- Team Sergeant / non-commissioned officer in charge.
- Communications specialist.
- Special operations mobility instructor pilot.
- Special operations mobility special mission aviator (SMA).
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) instructor pilot.
ISR instructor sensor operator.

Precision strike instructor pilot.

Precision strike instructor sensor operator.

Joint terminal attack controller instructor (JTAC-I).

Intelligence specialist.

Force protection specialist.

Maintenance specialist.

Medical specialist.

Aircrew flight equipment specialist.

Personnel recovery and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape specialist.

OADs are optimized for integrating and operationalizing airpower functions into joint special operations while maintaining a small logistical footprint and signature. Proper employment of the OAD requires thorough mission assessment to determine specific, measurable, attainable, results-oriented, and time-bound objectives. Where requirements exist outside of OAD capabilities, augmentation may be required.

Specialized Characteristics of CAA Forces

CAA readiness places high emphasis on adaptability. In accordance with USAF and USSOCOM certification criteria, CAAs maintain a wide variety of tactical, linguistic skillsets. Specifically, CAAs must be able to adapt to and integrate a variety of partners, platforms, methodologies, all in a variety of environments. CAA forces provide commanders foreign language skills, tailored force packaging, and competency in nonstandard aircraft and equipment, and adaptive aviation support programs.

CAA forces are best suited to conduct operations and activities where the following conditions are present:

- Joint advisory effort alongside joint SOF advisors (e.g. US Army special forces). This condition allows a joint team of advisors to address institutional stove-piping in the partnered force to allow for joint combat effects.

- **Complementary Authorities**: This condition ensures that authorities match the task and support the desired end-state to reduce risks to the mission, and that CAAs have complementary authorities to help provide partnered airpower to US advisors partnered with HN surface units to reduce risks to forces.
Use or availability of US-unilateral airpower is limited or untenable for political or capacity reasons.
Air Force security assistance teams supplement security cooperation organization capabilities by providing training, advice, and technical assistance to a host nation (HN). The teams vary in size and composition, and may or may not be funded and organized by the Department of Defense (see Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation, Appendix A, for more information).

Air Force personnel may deploy as an Air Force team or function as the air component of a larger joint effort. When the operation involves training or advisory efforts aimed at developing tactics, techniques, and procedures, teams should include Air Force members and members from the other US Services when appropriate. Appendix C has additional details on Air Force security assistance efforts.

Combatant commanders may employ Air Force security assistance teams for limited support on technical training in the operation and maintenance of specific airpower systems. The principal criteria for team selection are competence in the requested specialty, teaching skills, and language compatibility with HN recipients. When training and advisory teams are required to provide guidance on planning, developing, and employing airpower, teaching skills in one technical specialty are rarely sufficient.

Country teams or combatant commanders normally initiate in-country support requirements, which should be based on recommendations derived from surveys and assessments. This approach avoids the problem of a team deploying overseas to develop or improve operational capabilities of a particular weapon system when the host air force lacks the infrastructure or resources to employ the system effectively.

Surveys on security assistance support of foreign internal defense should include three basic tasks. The first task is to determine appropriate airpower roles and operations for the situation. Secondly, conduct an assessment of the HN ability to fulfill those roles with existing airpower resources. Finally, develop requirements and recommendations for improvements that can be carried out through HN initiatives or through additional US assistance. In addition to providing US defense equipment and services to the HN, Air Force logistics personnel should advise host-nation authorities on the use of airpower to establish and sustain internal defense and development programs through aerial lines.
of supply and personnel movement.

Training and equipment provided to the HN may not be sufficient to ensure the success of aviation programs in some conflict situations. When authorized and directed by appropriate legal authority, Air Force advisory personnel may also be employed to advise host air force units on how to employ air-support resources in a manner that serves the combined interests of the US and the HN.
In certain training, wartime, or contingency deployments, training and advisory Air Force personnel may collocate with both US and host nation (HN) land or maritime forces to accomplish liaison functions and to advise on joint air-ground operations. Specially qualified advisors can accompany US Army or Navy teams into an objective area to provide an Airman’s perspective. Support to Joint counterparts can entail aviation assessments of HN capabilities and limitations as well as operational- or tactical-level advice on the employment of HN airpower. Support may also include familiarization with the characteristics of HN tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Commanders should employ air advisors to help plan and integrate foreign aviation forces into multinational theater campaigns, contingency actions, and other joint or multinational activities, and to assist foreign aviation forces in operational and tactical planning. Commanders should shape the battlefield prior to the onset of crisis or war by employing air advisors to promote and test multinational effectiveness, safety, and interoperability among joint-coalition players.

Joint force commanders should employ air advisors to maintain coordination links between US and multinational air tasking authorities and foreign aviation units. Support includes liaison and advisory assistance to the joint force air component commander for air operations directive and air tasking order planning and execution involving foreign aviation forces. Assistance includes facilitating airspace deconfliction and area air defense coordination among coalition partners, evaluating safety and interoperability between US and foreign forces, and increasing the tactical effectiveness of foreign airpower in multinational operations. Air advisors may be used when foreign aviation forces are employed as theater-assigned assets and when operations involving dissimilar types of aircraft are planned. For additional information, see Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

Additionally, personnel of other US or multinational Services may accompany and train with air advisors in an objective area to provide the necessary ground or maritime perspective in a multinational arms scenario. An Army or naval advisor, for example, can help air advisors provide HN air force personnel a surface warfare perspective on joint air-ground operations. At the same time, air advisors can help Army or naval
advisors provide HN army or navy counterparts the corresponding air warfare perspective. This concept is designed to promote effectiveness, safety, and interoperability, not only between HN service components, but also between participating HN units and US forces. Training and advisory teams' efforts in this case are aimed at helping the HN aviation unit provide air support to its own ground and maritime forces. In a classic joint initiative, US surface forces may be training and advising HN surface-force counterparts.
EMPLOYMENT IN DIRECT SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The Air Force can provide direct support at varying levels of conflict intensity to enhance or supplement security assistance activities and host aviation programs. To preserve host nation (HN) self-sufficiency and legitimacy, the Air Force should maintain a proper balance between direct and indirect forms of assistance. Such direct support initiatives as combat advising and assisting may be used concurrently with security assistance to prevent the transition to more destructive forms of warfare and higher levels of US involvement. At the same time, direct support initiatives should not undermine the HN's will or capacity to achieve an internal solution to the crisis.

HN airpower requirements may exceed the objectives and limitations of security assistance and joint-multinational exercises. Concurrently, a US combat role may be tactically inappropriate or politically infeasible as a foreign internal defense (FID) instrument. To satisfy some of these requirements at acceptable levels of commitment and risk, the Air Force can employ its resources in a variety of direct support roles that bridge the gap between indirect assistance and combat operations. Examples include intelligence sharing, logistics airlift, equipment loans, communications support, and other "stand-off" options.

Direct support (not including combat) does not eliminate all risks, but it offers a means of providing specialized assistance to a HN without directly exposing US personnel to hostile fire. Direct Air Force involvement in such activities as humanitarian and civil assistance and military civil action (MCA) requires the physical presence of Air Force personnel working in close contact with friendly elements. For some operations like intelligence collection and military information support operations, it may be possible to conduct operations from outside the recipient country when there are political or operational constraints on the presence of Air Force assets on foreign installations. Clandestine or low-visibility techniques and procedures in politically sensitive or denied areas may also be required for combat operations. Commanders should consider the use of Air Force special operations forces to conduct these kinds of operations if required.

During multinational operations, commanders should anticipate differences in tactics, techniques, and procedures between US and HN forces. Commanders should consider
using Air Force advisory personnel to resolve these differences and make adjustments
to fit the strengths and weaknesses of the multinational force. Commanders may also
have to tailor their operating procedures to suit specific objectives, operational
constraints, legal limitations and policies pertaining to the use of Air Force forces in the
HN.

A central objective of combat operations is to protect vital resources and to buy time for
the host government to stabilize its social, economic, and political institutions. The Air
Force role is supportive only. It is not designed to capture the strategic initiative or to
transfer strategic responsibilities from the host government to the United States. To
preserve HN legitimacy and achieve a lasting, internal solution to the conflict, the host
government must carry full responsibility for the strategic offensive. The Air Force FID
effort should be designed to transfer air support tasks and responsibilities to the HN as
soon as practical.
Force protection for foreign internal defense (FID) applies to deployed operational units supporting host-nation internal defense and development programs. Commanders exercise force protection to ensure the defense and survival of US personnel, facilities, command and control structures, and weapon systems. Specific force protection guidance is contained in Annex 3-10, Force Protection.

FID training and advisory teams often deploy to locations where there is no other US military presence. Commanders should, commensurate with the estimated threat level, ensure that force protection personnel deploy as an integral part of the team. These teams are typically small. Force protection personnel should be prepared to conduct threat, criticality, vulnerability, and risk assessments and make recommendations to the commander for risk management. They should also provide some measure of force protection for the deployed team. Indigenous security force personnel may augment the US team’s force protection effort and provide security for their own forces and resources. The early integration of host nation security forces into the FID operating environment should be a priority consideration. In-country training and advisory FID teams should possess a robust blue-force tracking capability, or similar capability.
Personnel recovery (PR) for foreign internal defense applies to all deployed operational units supporting host nation (HN) internal defense and development programs. Specific personnel recovery guidance is outlined in Annex 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

Training and advisory teams often deploy to locations where there is no other US presence, and are typically outside the normal PR architecture. In those cases, support from national space agencies becomes vitally important. Commanders responsible for austere FID activity should ensure plans are in place to support self-recovery operations, and that PR plans integrate with the training and advisory team’s force protection plan. If lack of HN PR infrastructure dictates, Air Force combat search and rescue forces can assess, train, advise, and assist as needed to maintain team integrity and establish HN mechanisms for PR operations, thereby enhancing safety of US and HN forces.

Effective integration of PR advisory operations serves two primary purposes. First, training and advising in PR assists the HN with its overall employment of airpower during combat operations and search and recovery activities. Second, effective PR training enhances the HN’s capability to execute PR operations in support of US activities during potential contingency operations.
Enhancing foreign airpower capabilities remains essential to US overseas defense posture and exit strategies. Air Force commanders are called upon to provide ideas and recommendations to establish or increase foreign capabilities to perform successfully. Commanders may have to define systems options for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counterdrug programs in terms of various types of aircraft and equipment. They may have to indicate possible courses of action, including off-the-shelf air platforms, modifications, and systems that would fit within foreign aviation needs and capabilities.

The ability of Air Force personnel to conduct foreign internal defense in the assess-train-advise-assist mission set depends on the airpower capabilities of host nations. Commanders should be aware that the ability of lesser-developed nations to perform airpower roles varies, based mostly on levels of indigenous funding, technology, and training.
Optimal solutions involving the enablement of foreign aviation forces are those that are the most realistic for a given set of conditions in the host nation (HN). Exploiting the full potential of airpower in foreign aviation units will depend on a variety of factors including cost, availability, complexity, ease of maintenance, durability, survivability, performance trade-offs, etc. Regardless of how obvious or desirable a particular capability or air platform may seem, the recommended assets must fit within the technological and financial resources, as well as the mission needs of assisted nations. As an example, a day-night capability with real-time tactical awareness promoting maximum threat avoidance and minimum threat exposure to defeat a threat in non-permissive environments is a desired goal, but it may be unsupportable given the prevailing financial and technological restrictions in the typical HN.

Achieving US foreign policy objectives in foreign internal defense may, in some instances, require that HNs possess aircraft capable of performing the critical operational functions, to include air mobility; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; counterland; combat search and rescue; and casualty evacuation. In addition to cost and complexity considerations, aircraft optimized for internal defense of countries with lesser developed militaries should be able to operate from relatively unimproved forward operating locations and be sustainable in the field for extended periods of time using small aviation maintenance teams.
APPENDIX A: INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

To establish a realistic context for counterinsurgency (COIN) air operations, this appendix describes the dynamics of classical insurgency and counterinsurgency. A detailed treatment of the many variants and paradigms of COIN is beyond the scope of this document. Accordingly, the following text attempts to establish a generic profile for the conflict arena, acknowledging that insurgencies vary considerably in scope and detail. There are situations, for example, where insurgent forces may want something less than total control of the government. There are also examples of insurgents being impervious to government reforms or concessions (e.g., Khmer Rouge fighters bent on destroying the government and all its supporters through combat actions).

The appendix describes ways to apply various instruments of power to achieve balanced development, neutralize enemy combatant forces, and promote political mobilization and legitimacy through reforming economic and legal sectors of society, alleviating grievances, recognizing causes, etc. This appendix provides Air Force commanders, trainers, advisors, and other personnel involved in foreign internal defense (FID) a basic framework for understanding and evaluating the major components of the conflict arena. This framework is the basis for Air Force FID planning and execution, and especially for recognizing appropriate and inappropriate uses of airpower resources.

The discussion focuses on the nature and characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency and on the major functions and objectives of a host nation's (HN's) internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy. Insurgencies have individual characteristics that should be taken into consideration. The classic concept of social, economic, and political fragmentation engenders a “winning hearts and minds” approach to successfully countering insurgent movements, an idea that gained relevancy during the Vietnam War era. This idea does not have universal application.

ANALYZING INSURGENCY

Because insurgencies vary greatly in form, scope, and intensity, it is impossible to construct a universal model. Elements can be analyzed to determine the composition and likely direction of an insurgent movement. The way an insurgency is inspired,
organized, and employed should be of principal interest to FID planners. Typically, insurgency incorporates an ideological content that furnishes a revolutionary theory and cause; a revolutionary infrastructure providing leadership, organization, logistics, communications, and intelligence; and a militant arm to defend the revolutionary movement and help achieve its political objectives. Understanding these elements allows those defending against an insurgency to direct their campaign against root causes and supporting infrastructure as well as the insurgent’s military forces. To devise appropriate countermeasures, including the use of airpower, defense planners should also analyze the insurgent's strategy—the goals and likely methods of attack.

**Ideological Content**

Poverty, class oppression, political disenfranchisement, and ethnic or religious strife often create the necessary conditions for revolution, but are rarely sufficient to generate armed conflict. Given economic and political grievances, another condition must be met. A catalyst must draw attention to these grievances and focus them on the failure of the state to act in the best interests of the people. The catalyst originates in the ideological content of the revolution (Marxism or religion, for example). Together, the grievances and the ideological content function as necessary conditions to set the revolution in motion. Ideology is the mechanism for connecting the population with the central ideas and goals of the revolutionary movement. It defines the economic and political future of the revolutionary state and provides the inspirational basis for revolt. The ideological underpinnings of a revolution may extend beyond the legitimate needs and aspirations of the people. Insurgents bent on achieving power at any cost often view government reforms as a threat to their political ambitions.

**Revolutionary Infrastructure**

Revolutionary infrastructure furnishes the organizational devices to administer and control all social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives. Leaders, located at the infrastructure’s center, formulate strategic plans, policies, and goals. They are the source of political-ideological order and discipline. In many revolutions, political cadres located throughout the organizational structure represent party leadership. Overall, the infrastructure functions as the heart of the insurgent organization’s command and control (C2) system.

The infrastructure is often organized into interconnected, clandestine cells responsible for recruitment, training, intelligence, deception, propaganda, and logistics. C2 lines extend to insurgent military elements and, where possible, to agents located in various segments of local and national government, host military organizations, and society at large. Insurgents may conduct political action and influence operations through legal front organizations such as labor unions, organized student groups, and registered political parties.

The infrastructure is often a coalition of factions with differing grievances, ideological patterns, and political agendas. When faction leaders differ significantly over
revolutionary ends, ways, or means, internal alliances are often dynamic and fragile. The nature of these alliances—their dominant political direction and degree of cohesion—is an important indicator of the nature of the revolution, its strategic goals, strengths, and weaknesses.

**Insurgent Strategy**

Usually, insurgent strategy executes on multiple fronts (through social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives) to separate the government from the population and to neutralize the government's self-defense mechanisms. The contest is for legitimacy and, where possible, political mobilization of the people. Mobilization furnishes the revolution with workers, fighters, money, weapons, and intelligence, while at the same time denying these assets to the government. The insurgent creates opportunities to exert forms of political and economic control of the population by neutralizing the government’s authority through the use of information and force. In certain types of insurgency, the strategy is aimed at “out-administering” the host government. The insurgent does not necessarily require the active participation of the majority of the population, the insurgent can achieve objectives through neutrality or passive support.

**Military Operations**

The insurgent movement usually enters armed conflict with a small insurgent force that increases in strength as personnel and weapons become available. The insurgents fight as guerrillas because they lack the means to apply force quickly and decisively in open battle with defending conventional forces. The insurgents usually begin with little of the materiel and manpower resources available to the government. They avoid all-out confrontations, relying instead on accumulating smaller successes to achieve social, economic, psychological, and political objectives.

Guerrilla tactics extend the revolution with the means available, wearing down the host-nation financial and materiel resources and the political and moral resolve of foreign friends and allies supporting the counterinsurgency effort. Interdicting vital lines of communication, halting or slowing agricultural production, and inhibiting domestic and foreign trade, reduces the government's financial ability to resist. Successful interdiction of economic targets also undermines the legitimacy of the government by creating inflation, higher taxes, and critical shortages of goods and services. Insurgents may also employ terrorism or terrorist techniques (e.g., assassination, bombings, kidnapping, extortion, and blackmail) as tactical instruments to suppress or inhibit government actions. Selective attacks against industrial facilities, transportation systems, government officials, and civil law enforcement agencies may have significant psychological effect, primarily in discrediting the host government’s ability to manage and administer the affairs of state.

Guerrilla tactics may also function as a crucial lead-in phase to conventional operations aimed at defeating the government's main forces. In many instances, national security
forces are driven into their most defensible positions during the protracted guerrilla phase. This withdrawal provides insurgents time and secures maneuvering space to consolidate their political and economic control in rural areas. It also gives them time to establish their legitimacy and to assemble a larger, more conventionally structured force capable of making decisive, final assaults on government garrisons. When the defending forces become isolated in static positions, the government's chances of success are poor.

**Phased Actions**

A Maoist-type insurgency is usually a progressive, evolutionary process marked by a series of phases corresponding to major transitions in the revolutionary movement. Although insurgencies can take many forms, three phases are common to many: a pre-hostility or incipient phase, a guerrilla warfare phase, and a conventional confrontation phase.

- **Phase I** (pre-hostility or incipient phase) corresponds to infrastructure development plus initial recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping of combat elements. During this phase, insurgents may engage the government in open political confrontations like public demonstrations, labor strikes, and boycotts. Insurgents often establish secure base areas for military command elements and guerrilla operations during this phase. Political-ideological cadres focus on indoctrination of civilians and armed revolutionaries.

- **Phase II** (guerrilla warfare phase) is the first level of armed violence. Irregular forces engage in sabotage, interdiction of communication and logistics links, assassination, and selective attacks against government forces. Insurgents expand their secure base areas and, where possible, link them to form strategic enclaves of political autonomy.

- **Phase III** (conventional confrontation phase) marks the transition from guerrilla actions to operations incorporating the tactics, techniques, and procedures of conventional fire and maneuver.

The reference to conflict phases in a Maoist insurgency is only a means of identifying critical shifts in the scope and intensity of insurgent activity. Phases may not signify a clean break between one kind of activity and another and not every Maoist insurgency will pass through all three phases. Furthermore, non-Maoist insurgencies generally do not follow the three-phase model at all. Infrastructure development is a continuous process of expanding administration, C2, training, and employing mobilized resources. Mobilization of insurgent combat forces must continuously expand to carry the insurgency from one phase to the next. Similarly, guerrilla operations may carry over into the conventional confrontation phase as a force multiplier. An insurgency does not have to progress through all three phases to succeed. A critical combination of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures may be sufficient to precipitate a government’s collapse or persuade a government’s foreign backers to withdraw at any
stage of a conflict. For example, in Afghanistan’s war against Soviet occupation, insurgent operations essentially consisted of armed violence by irregular forces for the duration of the conflict, with no initial phase of infrastructure development and no transition from guerrilla actions to conventional confrontation required to force the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the collapse of the Soviet-supported government in Afghanistan.

A revolutionary movement is most vulnerable to government countermeasures during the initial build-up phase, before the insurgent develops military forces. Once the insurgency takes up armed combat, government countermeasures become far more complicated and difficult to apply. Insurgent warfare is, however, reversible.

Reversibility can work to the advantage of either side in the conflict. If an insurgency fails militarily in one phase, it can revert to a lower phase, thus securing its survival while generating or reinforcing combat capabilities. The government, on the other hand, may be able to capitalize on reduced levels of military activity to focus on solutions aimed at rooting out the infrastructure and eliminating economic and political grievances that may fuel the revolution.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Countering a revolutionary strategy focused on political or ideological mobilization and protracted violence requires a wide range of social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives. No single government initiative is sufficient, particularly when the insurgents are able to bind political-ideological goals with genuine grievances. The government’s initiatives should be taken simultaneously and should reinforce each other. These initiatives require all instruments of national power be combined into a single, integrated IDAD program using both military and civilian resources. An effective IDAD strategy emphasizes unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence and counterintelligence activities, minimum use of violence, and responsive government leadership and administration. Ideally, the IDAD strategy should be used early enough to prevent an insurgency, but it can also be employed to counter an insurgency that has already started. The strategy incorporates four major tasks—balanced development, mobilization, security, and neutralization.

Balanced Development

Balanced development attempts to create a social, economic, and political environment resistant to insurgent attack. It does this through reforms aimed at removing or alleviating sources of legitimate grievance that can be exploited by insurgent elements. Although the scope and detail of the reforms vary from country to country, their principal functions are to establish the defending regime’s legitimacy, capture the political initiative from the insurgent movement, and mobilize public support of IDAD efforts. In some cases, balanced development may require major investments in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Economic development, however, should be balanced with equally important nation-building initiatives in such areas as human rights, legal processes,
public education, communications, health care, transportation, utilities, water, and other public service programs. The host military often possesses unique capabilities in transportation, communications, and manpower that can be employed in nation-building programs. Balanced development should be driven by the nature of the conflict. In conflicts where the insurgency is inspired by economic grievances or class oppression, economic development may be very effective, whereas insurgencies based primarily on longstanding cultural, ethnic, or religious discord may respond better to other forms of nation building, like human rights and other political reforms.

Mobilization

The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Mobilization maximizes manpower, materiel resources, political support, and intelligence available to the government while denying these resources to the insurgent. The net effect of mobilization is a social-political environment in which the government can “out-administer” the leadership and control mechanisms of the insurgent movement. Mobilization relies heavily on informational instruments to instill public confidence in the government and to reduce anxiety over military initiatives.

Security

Security includes all activities to protect the population, the government, and vital economic resources from insurgent violence. Security provides a safe environment for balanced development and denies the enemy access to popular support. The ability of internal security forces to maintain law and order is a key factor in demonstrating the government’s legitimacy. During the early stages of insurgency, civil law enforcement agencies should function as a major line of defense for internal security. Revolution’s major dynamic—political mobilization—occurs at the grass-roots level, and the government agency closest to that level acts as the local police. Generally, the police are first to detect critical signs of unrest, particularly in rural areas, and they are often closest to important sources of human intelligence on infrastructure organization and methods. They also provide a nucleus for establishing local auxiliaries and paramilitary forces. In some instances, civilian security forces are more acceptable to the local populace than the military. Military participation may begin with lateral support or augmentation of the police during low levels of violence and increase to a direct combat posture if the insurgency escalates.

Neutralization

Neutralization is physically and psychologically separating the insurgents from the population. It includes all lawful activities to disrupt, disorganize, and defeat insurgent organizations. Neutralization thus enlarges the objectives of security to include eliminating sources of insurgent violence. Neutralization relies on civil law enforcement agencies as well as military forces to accomplish these objectives.

The principal target of neutralization is the active or tacit support that the insurgents
receive from the populace. Neutralization requires internal defense forces that are organized, trained, and equipped for joint combat operations. However, military force rarely is decisive in determining long-term strategic outcomes. Insurgent leaders and forces often are deeply embedded in the civilian sector. They operate in a clandestine manner, many times under the protective cover of legitimate institutions. In most cases, penetrating and rooting out leadership and other insurgent elements is done more effectively with legal, informational, and civil law enforcement and investigative instruments than with military forces. Defeating the insurgency militarily may drive the conflict to a lower level of violence or drive it underground, but it does not eliminate the social, economic, political, or cultural tensions fueling the insurgency. Counterintelligence activities may be the most effective mean in neutralizing the insurgency without escalating to the use of military force and operations. Counterintelligence activities can be employed to penetrate the insurgency to disrupt, exploit, or neutralize the insurgency’s overall effectiveness. Military force should be aimed at holding the conflict at the lowest possible level of violence while the government eliminates the insurgents’ infrastructure and engages in balanced development and reform. Force is not an end in itself, it is only a way to buy time until the processes of reform and nation building take effect.

The reversible, multiphase nature of insurgency requires great flexibility in planning and executing military operations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures appropriate for conventional confrontations may be ineffective, even counterproductive, when executing military operations during counter-guerrilla operations. Because of varying situations and force requirements, decision makers and planners require accurate, timely intelligence to facilitate the process of selecting proper options.

The social, psychological, and political implications of military actions, particularly those employing deadly force, should be clearly understood and correctly exploited by the HN government. Excessive or ineffective use of force erodes government legitimacy and promotes political mobilization in favor of the insurgents. Even when the government assumes special emergency powers through legislation or decree, security forces must provide for the safety of law-abiding citizens.
Coincidental with testing and evaluating mutual capabilities, joint and multinational exercises may include training and construction, as well as humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) projects, within a host country. Although the exercises may be conducted between US Air Force and the host air force units only, maximum utility is realized when they involve joint as well as multinational operations.

INTEROPERABILITY AND SAFETY TRAINING

Interoperability Training

The purpose of interoperability training is to ensure that US and host nation (HN) forces can function as mutually supporting entities during combat operations. Training to achieve interoperability should include doctrine, tactics, individual skills, weapons familiarization (particularly if US and host forces use different weapon systems), maintenance, and command and control procedures.

Interoperability training assumes that comparably proficient units are involved. The training experience allows US commanders to learn how other forces conduct internal defense and development operations and to develop the most compatible methodology, consistent with US foreign internal defense (FID) policies and objectives, for operating together.

If the foreign force is not proficient enough to conduct multinational operations with US forces, foreign military sales provided under security assistance should be conducted to equalize the foreign force before multinational exercises are undertaken. Joint-multinational exercises are not to be used to provide training to foreign military personnel if that training is normally provided under security assistance.

Safety Training

Safety training reduces the risks inherent in conducting military operations by two or more forces differing widely in language, culture, geographic origin, technology, and practical experience. Mutual safety is improved not only through training in the use of
specific weapons but also through standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

CONSTRUCTION

Construction related to multinational exercises is permitted under two sets of rules, one for Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises and another for non-JCS exercises.

JCS Exercises

Set-aside funds contained in the unspecified minor construction account of each US military Service pays for all exercise-related construction during JCS exercises. Set-aside funds cover only material, supplies, nonmilitary labor costs, overhead (except planning and design costs), and Department of Defense (DOD)-funded costs applicable to operations and maintenance (O&M) of equipment. O&M funds may not be used for construction related to JCS exercises.

Non-JCS Exercises

During non-JCS exercises, O&M funds may be used to construct or improve facilities under US control, if each construction project results in a usable facility for US units to take part in the multinational exercise. Strict project rules and precise funding limits are established for such construction.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

US Armed Forces personnel participate in HCA activities to create strategic, operational, and/or tactical effects that support combatant commander objectives in theater security cooperation or designated contingency plans while concurrently reinforcing skills required for the operational readiness of the forces executing the HCA mission. HCA may involve cooperation with host-nation military or paramilitary elements (to include the participation of third party organizations such as non-governmental or private and/or voluntary groups) to establish trust and enhance relations with those entities, but may not be provided directly or indirectly to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity.

Authority

HCA activities should be distinguished from similar types of projects that the Air Force may undertake to accomplish a military operation and that result in incidental benefits to the local population. Purpose and intent are the key factors in determining whether a specific activity is covered by Title 10, US Code, Armed Forces, § 401, “Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations.” For example, if an Air Force unit digs wells, clears land, and cuts a road through the jungle to service a base camp for the benefit of that unit; those activities would not constitute HCA even if they result in ancillary and unintended benefits to a local populace.
Expenses incurred as a direct result of providing HCA (other than minimal cost HCA) to a foreign country shall be paid for with funds specifically appropriated for such purposes (specifically included in Air Force’s operation and maintenance account). Funding for HCA activities is provided by the annual National Defense Authorization Act and obligated for incremental expenses such as costs for consumable materials, supplies, and services, if any, that are reasonably necessary to execute HCA activities. Funding does not include costs associated with the military operation (e.g., transportation, personnel expenses, petroleum, oils and lubricants, repair of equipment), which would likely have been incurred whether or not the HCA was provided.

**Forms of HCA**

Use of HCA is limited to authorized HCA activities and minimal cost HCA, as defined by Department of Defense Instruction 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*. Commanders contemplating the use of HCA should seek legal advice on the form of HCA most appropriate for the operation or exercise being conducted, especially with respect to rules governing HCA limitations and funding.

**HCA Activities.** HCA activities performed in conjunction with authorized military operations include medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country. Activities may include education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. HCA projects are planned and developed through normal security cooperation protocols. The country team in coordination with the HN develops project nominations. When the plan is developed, it is coordinated through United States Agency for International Development to determine no duplication of efforts and is approved by the US ambassador to the country. Recommended HCA projects are then submitted to the combatant commanders for prioritization and funding; they in turn submit their projects to the JCS for coordination with legal counsel, country desk officers, the Department of State Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who finally approves project nominations. Messaging within the HN is achieved in coordination with and through the US embassy.

**Minimal-Cost HCA.** The maximum amount authorized for a minimal-cost project is included in the annual HCA guidance message prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. The determination that an expenditure is “minimal” shall be made by geographic combatant commanders for activities within their respective areas of responsibility, in the exercise of reasonable judgment, in light of the overall cost of the military operation in which such expenditure is incurred, and for an activity that is incidental to the military operation.

**Stevens HCA.** This provides that O&M funds may be used to pay costs incurred in providing HCA incidental to authorized military operations. Stevens HCA is limited to
JCS-directed or coordinated exercises. Stevens HCA must complement, not duplicate, other assistance provided by the US and enhance the security interests of both the US and the HN. It must enhance the operational skills of US military personnel and must be “incidental” in nature. Incidental HCA are those activities that are “minor” when viewed in the context of the overall exercise scenario in which they occur.
Appendix C: Air Force Security Assistance Teams

This appendix assists commanders in identifying and selecting appropriate options for foreign internal defense (FID) by providing a brief survey of teams who perform functions under security assistance. One of the key operational-level objectives of Air Force advisory operations is to help integrate host-nation airpower into the multinational and joint arenas. Commanders should refer to current directives and publications for guidelines and specific policy on assistance provided under the Air Force security assistance program. This appendix also discusses functions, goals, and special constraints associated with Air Force advisory support to host nations (HNs).

Basis of Requirement

Legislative guidance limits training and advising by permanently assigned security cooperation organization (SCO) personnel. Also, SCOs are not sufficiently sized or configured to advise and train or perform technical assistance duties that extend beyond primary (and essentially logistical) SCO functions. Outside assistance may be required in specific instances.

Types of Teams

Besides SCOs, several teams and organizations may perform limited security assistance functions for specified periods of time on a temporary duty or permanent change of station basis. These teams include technical assistance teams (TAT), technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), mobile training teams (MTTs), extended training service specialists (ETSSs), quality assurance teams, language training detachments, site survey teams, and defense requirement survey teams.

Commanders for FID activities can employ these teams and others assembled for specific purposes, such as health service support teams. In certain instances, temporarily deployed Air Force teams may be called on to advise foreign personnel on operational matters directly related to the use of host-nation resources in specific conflict situations.
Non-Training Support of Host-Nation Forces

A variety of non-training assistance functions can be accomplished under the security assistance program. The principal vehicles for non-training support are TATs and TAFTs.

Technical Assistance Teams

In cases where the operational readiness of host aircraft and support equipment is seriously degraded because of battle damage, unexpected materiel failures, or long-term deficiencies in local maintenance and funding, a requirement for one-time repair and refurbishment may exist. Introducing new equipment provided under security assistance may also require specialized Air Force assistance to place the systems in operation.

TATs and civilian engineering technical surveys can be deployed to provide these services. In some cases, US or foreign civilian contract personnel may be used. Such non-training support may be conducted in the host country or, when prohibited or deemed impractical because of inadequate local facilities, conducted out of country.

TATs should not be used to provide technical training or instruction except for incidental over-the-shoulder technical assistance in conjunction with their primary duties.

Technical Assistance Field Teams

Where ongoing aviation support requirements cannot be met through the combined efforts of the host air force, the SCO, and temporarily deployed Air Force teams, TAFTs can be sent to the HN, normally for one year or longer, from Department of Defense (DOD) resources. TAFTs help install, operate, maintain, and support foreign military sales, purchased weapon systems, and equipment.

Specialized Non-training Support

Besides TATs and TAFTs, other forms of non-training support allow commanders to tailor team capabilities to meet specialized field requirements.

Air Force assistance teams (funded through security assistance) can use periodic visits to offset host-nation aircraft materiel management deficiencies by performing inventories, refining procedures, clearing up back orders, and resolving accounting discrepancies.

The Air Force can provide other specialized forms of non-training support. An example is theater technical training of US logisticians through the logistics team training (LTT) program. Small teams (10 to 15 individuals) train in such combat support skills as aircraft battle damage repair, corrosion control, materiel management, specialized
maintenance, transportation operations, or other combat support functions. Service O&M funds support the training of US personnel. Host-nation security assistance funds pay for repair parts and other expendables used by an LTT during training activities.

- The LTT concept is designed to ensure, and the Service must certify, that deployments offer opportunities for critical training that would not occur, or would occur at significantly higher costs or reduced efficiency in another similar geographic area. The concept is based on the precept that certain US forces training is so critical and reasonably unavailable that incidental, spin-off services provided to a foreign country in exchange for the training opportunities are insignificant in the balance of benefits, thereby making the training in the best interests of the US Government.

- As with TATs, training or instruction of host personnel is limited to incidental, “over-the-shoulder” technical assistance.

**Training Support to Host Nation’s Forces**

In many cases, incidental “over-the-shoulder” instruction occurring as a byproduct of certain non-training functions may not be sufficient to produce significant improvements in long-term self-sufficiency. Training teams, funded under security assistance, should be used where more extensive, formally structured courses of instruction are required. The teams can be deployed to reinforce SCO capabilities.

**Mobile Training Teams**

MTTs deployed to the recipient nation add to SCO capabilities by training HN personnel in the operation, maintenance, and employment of airpower weapon systems and support equipment. MTTs are authorized for specific in-country training requirements beyond the capability of SCOs, primarily to develop the recipient’s self-training capabilities in particular skills. MTTs may be funded from either foreign military sales or international military education and training programs.

MTTs are also authorized to provide training associated with equipment transfers or to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. MTTs may be requested to carry out specific training tasks for limited periods of time. MTTs will not be used to assemble, maintain, operate, or renovate a system.

**Extended Training**

Sustained Air Force training capabilities are available through ETSSs who are technically qualified to provide advice, instruction, and training in the engineering, installation, operation, and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and systems.
Advisory Support to Host-Nation Forces

When specifically authorized and directed, deployed Air Force security assistance teams advise host military personnel on using airpower systems and related support capabilities. Advisory functions are subject to legislative restrictions and DOD directives on levels and types of assistance provided. Commanders and SCO personnel requesting this type of assistance must ensure that advisory activities fall within current policy guidelines and legal parameters.

Command Advisory Functions

Air Force advisory assistance may be required to facilitate host air force support of internal defense and development (IDAD) objectives and to encourage a satisfactory correlation between US security assistance goals and the recipient's use of security assistance assets. Advisory assistance teams accomplish these tasks by advising central command elements of the host military on the capabilities, limitations, and correct use of airpower in a given conflict. Command advisory functions focus on operational-level planning that can bridge the gap between IDAD strategy and tactical employment.

Field Advisory Functions

Air Force advisory assistance conducted at the field level (operational flying units, aviation support elements, and army maneuver units) focuses primarily on improving host military tactics, techniques, and procedures for airpower operations.

Air Force advisory functions include mission-related advice on intelligence collection and analysis, maintenance, logistics, communications, and administration as well as tactical operations. Field advisory support also has important applications in medical and military civic action programs, military construction, and influence operations. Its principal objective is to provide guidance fostering self-sufficiency in the use of airpower resources for the conflict at hand, not to supplant host-nation capabilities.

Field advisory functions should be closely linked to operational-level objectives supporting overall US and HN strategic goals. This entails such field advisory functions as testing and verifying HN airpower employment and sustainment capabilities, focusing HN aviation resources on appropriate roles and missions, and facilitating the availability of safe, reliable, and interoperable aviation support as a force multiplier for the US joint force commander.

Field advisory functions are not automatically linked to direct participation in host military operations. Advisory functions that expose US personnel to hostile fire represent a significant increase in US commitment with profound legal and political implications. Personnel performing defense services may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising, that may
engage US personnel in combat activities outside the US in accordance with US Code.