There are two fundamental ways to classify federated support, which affect how relationships are built, help determine how taskings are conveyed, and influence how information is disseminated. All components—Air Force and joint, official and unofficial—are required for effective federation.

**Air Force and Joint/National.** Air operations center (AOC) planners are concerned with two federated systems: one that is internal to the Air Force (also known as reachback) and one that involves joint and national agencies. The Air Force has control over only its reachback capabilities. The joint/national system is based on the needs of geographic combatant commanders (CCDR) or joint force commanders (JFC). These needs are coordinated with the larger joint community through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) intelligence directorate’s (J2) Deputy Director for Targeting (J26). However, the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) should submit requirements through the CCDR or JFC for any joint or national federated support needed. In both cases, federated support should be coordinated prior to hostilities. Such coordination should delineate specific duties to federated partners, establish timelines, and determine the methods of communication to be used. Additionally, whenever possible, COMAFFORs should coordinate federated partner participation in theater exercises. Without proper coordination, federated partners may be unclear of duties once hostilities begin. Exercise participation may reveal points of friction, process errors, and operational limitations that coordination alone may not reveal. Federated partners may also have conflicting priorities if multiple contingencies occur simultaneously in different theaters as most federated partners are not subordinate to a single, specific theater. Solid peacetime working relationships may help reduce the impact of such seams or priority conflicts.

**Official and Unofficial.** Targeting and assessment are year-round efforts. In the past, many organizations supported theater targeting efforts even though they were not officially part of a federated team. This support was often slow, due to limitations of existing communication technology. Development of the internet and creation of Intelink, however, ushered in a whole new era of federated partnership. Much of the intelligence that was created for and sent to specific theaters in years past is now disseminated through global networks. Peacetime federation, therefore, is often informal. During hostilities, however, formal relationships are necessary, since timelines are severely
reduced. For instance, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) creates imagery-based products daily that can be used for target development, even though they are based on a multitude of requirements other than targeting support. AOC planners can coordinate with NGA to obtain these products, but they require no formal relationship to do so. While the intelligence community is doing its mission, the AOC is simply taking advantage of available resources. During a conflict, however, the AOC’s needs may require specific NGA action and be much more time-critical. This may require a formal request for support from the JFC to the NGA. Obviously, if the need can be anticipated and planned for, the partners can accomplish the necessary requests and coordination, which may improve the timeliness and quality of the support. The bottom line is that, while peacetime requirements may be met using a less formal federated structure, contingencies dictate that all federation partners know exactly what support is required of them, the timelines involved with providing the support, and in what manner they need to provide it.