Historically, the United States provides for the security of its allies by threatening a nuclear response in the event of an enemy attack. This threat of retaliation serves as the foundation for what is defined as extended deterrence.

Extended deterrence involves defense guarantees by a state to its allies, usually -- but not exclusively -- in the form of formal military alliances, the purpose of which is to deter a common opponent from undertaking military moves that might affect the political and military interests of the allies. Extended deterrence thus depends on the sharing of important security interests, as well as coordination, between the guarantor and the ally. In order to succeed, it also requires sufficient political will from both sides to enter into, and maintain, this security relationship.

-- Yair Evron, “Extended Deterrence in the Middle East,”
Nonproliferation Review, November 2012

Extended deterrence is sometimes described as providing a nuclear umbrella over allies and partners. The United States pledges use of its own nuclear arsenal to allies in order to provide for their security and serves as a nonproliferation tool by obviating the need for allies and partners to develop or acquire and field their own nuclear arsenals.

In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the continued deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe is a strategic alliance issue. This on-going forward

One of the main lessons of US commitments in both NATO and East Asia has been that constant consultations and the creation of forums for such consultations and common planning contributes to both deterrence and assurance.

There are, however, significant differences between the United States’ European and East Asian commitments. NATO is an alliance comprising many states in which there is an overall unifying commitment, with the United States providing the main (nuclear) security assurance. US ground and air units are deployed in some states. In addition to the US-based arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons are deployed in several European states. In East Asia, US commitments are structured very differently. There are separate bilateral defense agreements with different states, including Japan, Australia, South Korea, and, less explicitly, Taiwan.

-- Yair Evron, “Extended Deterrence in the Middle East,”
Nonproliferation Review, November 2012
basing of US nuclear capabilities not only extends deterrence of adversaries on behalf of European allies, but also assures NATO partners that the Air Force is capable of helping ensure their collective national security.

According to the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, “Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside conventional and missile defense forces. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. Allies agree … to develop concepts for how to ensure broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their nuclear sharing arrangements.” For the United States’ Pacific partners, the Air Force provides a nuclear umbrella over Japan and South Korea, as well as Australia and New Zealand.

South Korea said a B-52 bomber will fly over the Korean peninsula today for the second time this month as part of the U.S. effort to send a signal to North Korea after it threatened preemptive nuclear strikes.

“Just having the B-52 near the Korean peninsula and pass through means that the U.S. nuclear umbrella can be provided whenever necessary,” South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min Seok told reporters in Seoul, declining to disclose today’s flight time. The bombers carry air-to-ground missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) and “are believed to deliver nuclear warheads,” he said.

The first B-52 flight came on March 8 as part of joint U.S.-South Korea military drills, Defense Department spokesman George Little said yesterday in a statement, adding such flights “are routine.” Deputy defense secretary Ashton Carter in Seoul yesterday reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to deter North Korea independent of its multi-billion dollar defense budget cuts. ……

“We are drawing attention to the fact we have extended deterrence capabilities that we believe are important to demonstrate in the wake of recent North Korean rhetoric,” Little said yesterday in a statement.

-- “U.S. Flies B-52s Over Korea in Show of Power Against North,” Bloomberg News Report, 19 March 2013

Extended deterrence and assurance of allies are two sides of the same coin. Shows of force, which are “operations designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives,” shape both allied and adversary beliefs.
“It takes only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”


For additional discussion on effects, see “Practical Design: The Coercion Continuum” in Annex 3-0, *Operations and Planning.*