Disclaimer:
This guide is designed to familiarize Airmen with the basic five-paragraph order used for joint operations. This guide does not replace the use of the Joint Planning Process (JPP). Rather, it assists Airmen in creating the final product (an order) at the end of applying the JPP. The JPP is an orderly, analytical set of steps used to frame and understand a problem, then develop, analyze, and compare alternate courses of action (COAs) or solutions, select the best COA, and build a plan or order. Orders are produced by commanders (at all levels) when it is determined that prudent planning is required to address a possible contingency or developing crisis situation. The order format used in this tool is IAW the format prescribed in AFDP-1, pg. 12, the USAF Modified Five-Paragraph Order Format. Further information regarding the JPP, orders and/or plans can be found in JP 5-0, Joint Planning; and CJCSM 3130.03A, Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance.

NOTE: Example text below is from MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ (MNC-I) OPORD 05-03, declassified on 201506 by MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff.

Directions for use:

1. This guide shows a description, source, and in some cases, example text in many areas of the 5-paragraph order to provide additional insight and source(s) that can be further researched for order content and format.

2. It is intended to be used as a companion document to the Five-Paragraph Mission-Type Order (MTO) Training Tool that can be used to study 5-paragraph orders in further detail or to facilitate orders creation. Note: The Five-Paragraph MTO Training Tool requires MS Word to function properly.

3. POC for questions about the Guide, Tool, or Additional Instructions: gary.gottschall.1@us.af.mil; DSN 493-7687, COMM 334-953-7687.
OPERATION ORDER

**EXAMPLE: (U) MNC-I Operation Order 05-03**

BASIC ORDER (U)

(U) References: *Include documents that provide authorities and guidance for the order.*

(U) TIME ZONE: (ZULU)

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex A (Task Organization).

1. **(U) Situation.**

   **Description:**
   Describes current event: may include political situation and possible adversary forces in the expected area of operation, a brief description of the area of operation, actions of neighboring and/or friendly nations other and/or amplifying information as necessary.

1.A. **(U) Assessment or General.**

   **Description:**
   Describe the general politico-military environment that would establish the preconditions for execution. Identify the primary enemy and summarize the competing political economic, social/cultural and security (military) goals that could cause the conflict. State US policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties. Outline political decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy goals and conduct effective US military operations to attain US military missions to include, but not limited to, theater access, weapons employment, participation in operations, and disclosure of information requirements.

1.B. **(U) Area of Concern.**

   **Description:**


Describes the area for which the plan’s designated commander is responsible. The designated commander for a plan may be the CCDR, a Joint Task Force Commander, a Commander of Combined/Multinational Forces, or any other commander designated.

Note: Other terms commonly used: (1) **Area of Responsibility**. Describes the area for which the plan’s designated commander is responsible. (The designated commander for a plan may be the CCDR, a Joint Task Force Commander, a Commander of Combined/Multinational Forces, or any other commander designated); (2) **Joint Operational Area**. Describes the joint operational area. Description may be brief if Annex C will be included. (e.g., a list of latitude/longitude boundary points).

1.C. (U) **Enemy**.

Describes the enemy and provides details regarding the following categories. The categories listed provide a starting point but should be adapted to the situation. (1) **Centers of Gravity**.
   (a) **Strategic**.
   (b) **Operational**.
(2) **Critical Factors**.
   (a) **Strategic**
   (b) **Operational**
(3) **Courses of Action (COA)**. Provide both Most Likely and Most Dangerous COAs as it relates to the following:
   (a) **General**
   (b) **End State**
   (c) **Strategic Objectives**
   (d) **Operational Objectives**
   (e) **Concept of Operations**
(4) **Logistics and Sustainment**
(5) **Other Forces/Capabilities**
(6) **Reserve Mobilization**

1.D. (U) **Friendly**.

provides details regarding the following categories. The categories listed provide a starting point but should be adapted to the situation. (1) **Centers of Gravity**.
   (a) **Strategic** (e.g. US Public Support, World Opinion, etc.)
   (b) **Operational** (e.g. JTF Level: 3D MEB; JFMCC Level: CSF)
(2) **Critical Factors**. (i.e. Critical Strengths, Critical Weaknesses)
   (a) **Strategic**
   (b) **Operational**
(3) **Multinational Forces**
(4) **Supporting Commands and Agencies**
(5) **Operational Contract Support. Based on the commander’s guidance for use of contractor support.**
1.E. (U) Legal Considerations.

(1) International law, including the law of armed conflict
(2) Domestic law
(3) Host-nation and coalition laws
(4) Rules of engagement
(5) Status of forces agreements

Reference: CJCSM 3130.03A, C-A-1 (Orders Format)

Note: Other items that may be included: Operational Limitations (restraints – those things we cannot do, and constraints – those things we must do). List of actions prohibited or required by higher headquarters such as ROE, termination criteria, etc.; risk, legal concerns.

*Note: The numbering shown in the MNC-I example does not align completely with this format. The paragraph numbers are as written in MNC-I OPORD 05-03. Each example is provided for content, not numerical alignment.

MNC-I Example:

1. (U) Situation. This order supersedes OPORD 05-02, 01 April 2005, and 05-02 Update, 01 July 2005, and serves as the base guidance for Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) operations beginning 20 November 2005. As expected, conditions have changed over time and the course of operations. This order does not dictate significant course corrections from the previous operations order (OPORD) and Update. However, it incorporates emergent campaign planning at Multi-National Forces, Iraq and the United States Embassy, Baghdad (MNF-I/USEMB) and it reorganizes and restructures the content. The intent of this order is to provide necessary guidance to ensure MNC-I maintains operational and tactical momentum beyond the Iraqi National Elections and through the seating of the constitutionally elected Government of Iraq. 1.A. (U) General. (U) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) must be viewed in the context of the Global War on Terror and USCENTCOM’s role in this effort. Relevant guidance is contained in the March 2005 USCENTCOM PLANORD “Posturing for the Long War” and its counterpart the August 2005 PLANORD “Countering Al Qaida and Associated Movements.

1.A.3. (U) Area of Concern.
1.A.3.A. (U) Area of Interest. The Area of Interest is Iraq’s neighboring countries and the broader Middle East, including both North Africa and the Horn of Africa, which generate and transmit Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF) into Iraq. The region contains allies and friends that support the mission (such as Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia…)
1.A.3.B. (U) Area of Operations. CG MNC-I is responsible for operations within the national borders of Iraq. The Area of Operations (AO) and force disposition is described in the figure below….

1.B. (U) Enemy Forces.
1.B.1. (U) Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF). Terrorists and foreign fighters continue to be the greatest near-term threat to security in Iraq. They continue to demonstrate the ability to coordinate and execute precision suicide attacks and create the perception of instability within Iraq...

1.B.2. (U) Saddamist (SDM). Saddamists remain the facilitators for other groups. Their infiltration of local governments and security forces will ensure their influence over segments of the Sunni population. Intimidation and coercion of those who support the GOI at the local level remains their TTP...

1.B.4. (U) Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA). The most likely course of action between December 2005 and July 2006 is the maintenance of the status quo. Attacks will average...

1.B.5. (U) Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA). The most dangerous course of action is that the people quickly lose faith in the new GOI because it fails to provide the services...

1.C. (U) Friendly Forces. USCENTCOM and MNF-I/USEMB are the MNC-I higher headquarters…other friendly forces include the Iraq Security Forces (ISF), elements of the United Nations (UN), the Government of Iraq (GOI), and a range of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations...

Note: Refer to the Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) for additional information on MLCOA, MDCOA, and COGs.

2. (U) Mission.

Description:
A concise statement of the task and purpose of the operation (usually one sentence). The mission statement is derived from Commander’s intent and nested with higher headquarters operations order.

The mission statement describes the mission in terms of the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. The commander’s operational approach informs the mission statement and helps form the basis for planning. The commander includes the mission statement in the planning guidance, planning directive, staff estimates, commander’s estimate, CONOPS, and completed plan.

Reference: JP 5-0, III-20

MNC-I Example:

2. (U) Mission. MNC-I builds capable Iraqi Security Forces and conducts counterinsurgency operations to neutralize1 the insurgency and to defeat Al Qaida in Iraq in order to transition the security lead to Iraqi Security Forces and the Government of Iraq.

3. (U) Execution.
3.A. (U) **Concept of Operations.**

**Description:**
A description of how the operation will be conducted to accomplish the mission. For a CCDR’s contingency plan, the appropriate commander’s estimate can be taken from the campaign plan and developed into a strategic concept of operation for a campaign or OPLAN. Otherwise, the CONOPS will be developed as a result of the COA selected by the JFC during COA development.

The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where, when, why, and how. It also contains the JFC’s strategic vision, intent, and guidance for force projection operations, including mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of all participating forces, activities, and agencies. (Refer to annex C [Operations] in the CONOPS.

This section includes Commander’s (CDR’s) intent, purpose, end state, phasing, tasks, and coordinating instructions. It includes a narrative of the actions to be taken and a generic organization for combat (main and supporting effort, reserve, etc.). The concept of operations is the course of action approved by the commander during planning. It may be summarized here if a detailed concept of operations is contained in Annex C (Operations). The concept of operations provides a basis for supporting concepts such as:

1. (U) Concept of Maneuver.
2. (U) Concept of Fires.
3. (U) Concept of Support.
4. (U) Other Concepts as Required.

**Reference:** JP 5-0, A-5, CJCSM 3130.03A, C-A-2

**MNC-I Example:**

3.B. (U) **Concept of the Operation.** To ensure simplicity and unity of effort, MNC-I adopts the phasing convention of the MNF-I/USEMB Joint Campaign Plan and conducts operations aligned with the higher headquarters’ lines of operation. Although MNC-I operational tasks fall primarily within the Security Line of Operation, all MNF-I/USEMB lines of operation are affected to some extent by MNC-I actions. Furthermore, MNC-I operations and allocation of forces within the MNC-I area of operations are characterized by the battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. MNC-I employs an effects-based
methodology to achieve desired objectives and assess effectiveness of MNC-I operations.


Description: This should describe the JFC’s intent (purpose and end state), overall and by phase. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and their supporting effects. It may also include how the posture of forces at the end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the JFC’s assessment of the enemy commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. The commander’s intent, though, is not a summary of the CONOPS.

The commander’s intent identifies the major unifying efforts during the campaign or operation, the points and events where operations must succeed to control or establish conditions in the OE, and where other instruments of national power will play a central role. The intent must allow for decentralized execution. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military objectives or attain the end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold or result as planned. While there is no specified joint format for the commander’s intent, a generally accepted construct includes the purpose, end state, and risk.


Description: The purpose explains why the military action is being conducted. The purpose can help the force pursue the mission in the absence of further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, commanders understand the purpose of the action and can act decisively and within the higher commander’s intent.

A military end state describes conditions that define mission success. It also describes how reaching the JFC’s military end state supports higher headquarters’ national objectives. The military end state normally represents a period in time or set of conditions beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power to achieve remaining national objectives. Commanders and planners constantly assess the stated military end state against the OE, resources, or policy.

Reference: DOD Dictionary, Pg 41; JP 5-0 Pg IV-18, I-19, I-20, A-5

MNC-I Example:

3.A.1. (U) Purpose. MNC-I continues operations to neutralize the insurgency, leadership and organizations, while developing the capacity for ISF to assume
battlespace and conduct independent COIN operations. MNC-I must transfer battlespace to ISF accepting a moderate level of tactical risk while the Corps retains sufficient forces to allow ISF to mature. We must place emphasis on developing effective Iraqi Police Services (IPS) to assume the security lead in designated urban areas and to provide domestic law and order. MNC-I establishes the security environment to develop local economies, governance, and the rule of law. Finally, MNC-I must transition both battlespace and basing in a manner that postures CF in operational overwatch.

(a) ISF have assumed battlespace and are capable of effective COIN operations 
(b) Iraq’s borders are under Iraqi control with ISF layered in-depth supported by CF enablers
(c) The insurgency is neutralized
(d) Al Qaida in Iraq is defeated
(e) Conditions are set for Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)
(f) Coalition Forces and bases are smaller and postured for overwatch


Description:
Objectives. Objectives and attainable goals are clearly defined, toward which operations are directed. They are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time bound. Objectives are markers used to assess the strategy and develop decision points.

(a) At the operational level, CCDRs identify, prioritize, and sequence intermediate objectives that support the achievement of the national-level objectives and associated conditions to support attainment of military end states. Intermediate objectives help assess progress toward the longer-range objectives established by the NDS, NMS, or JSCP. As intermediate objectives are achieved, commanders and their staffs reassess their vision of the military end state (for contingencies), their progress toward the longer-range objectives, and the need to change or alter the objectives or methods. Intermediate objectives also represent multiple actions that occur between initiation of a CCP and the achievement of campaign objectives. Intermediate objectives should identify discrete, identifiable, and measurable conditions or effects.

(b) At the tactical level, forces are arranged and employed to execute specific immediate tasks or missions. Although tactical tasks may not directly achieve operational or strategic objectives, the cumulative effects of the tactical events, coupled with operational and strategic events, should achieve those objectives. Both desired and undesired effects should be evaluated.

Reference: JP 5-0 Pg I-19

MNC-I Example:

Description:
Effects. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective and an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective.

Reference: JP 5-0 Pg IV-27

MNC-I Example:

(1) Assured CF mobility. Defined as AIF is unable to prevent CF movement along MSR/ASR or disrupt CF sustainment operations
(2) IA battalions and brigades assume battlespace. Defined as IA battalions and brigades at TRA Level 2 or higher plan and conduct COIN operations in assumed battlespace.
(3) AIF Leadership disrupted. Defined as: T&FF leadership is incapable of coordinating and employing foreign fighters and cannot effectively mass effects in space and time; SDM leadership is unable to receive financial support for operations; and IZR leadership is influenced to cooperate with GOI/CF by improvement in basic services, increased employment, and overall quality of life improvements.
(4) Roads leading to the interior are controlled by ISF. Vehicle Check Points (VCPs) are established on the roads that lead from the border to the major urban areas in central Iraq; AIF movement to the Iraqi interior is disrupted by VCP.


Description:
A COA is a potential way (solution, method) to accomplish the assigned mission. Staffs develop multiple COAs to provide commanders with options to attain the military end state. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander's guidance, provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative. All COAs must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.

3.B. (U) Tasks.

Description:
(1) List the tasks assigned to each subordinate commander in separate, numbered subparagraphs. Tasks are listed in order of priority or accomplishment. Tasks may be listed by phase. Designation of main effort or supporting effort is noted in tasking.

(2) Some actions are so critical that the commander may assign them as missions. These should be assigned as task and purpose (in order to . . .). Other actions are assigned simply as tasks because the purpose is understood. The commander assigns subordinate commanders tasks he deems necessary to fulfill his concept of operations.

(3) Unit or element task assignments are listed in the following order:
   
   (a) Offensive operations: ground combat units or elements (infantry first followed by artillery and combat support units numerically or alphabetically), aviation combat units or elements (aircraft units, combat support, combat service support), combat service support units or elements.

   (b) Defensive operations: units or elements closest to the enemy are listed first, ground and aviation combat units in the forward defense area are then listed in numerical order, other units are then listed alphabetically.

(4) Each task assignment may begin with the assets (attached or in support) available to the unit or element.

Reference: MCWP 5-10, Pg 139; CJCSM 3130.03A, G-C-5

MNC-I Example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.C. (U) Tasks.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.C.1. (U) MNF–NW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.C.1.B. (U) Employ Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT) teams to assess infrastructure attacks as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.C.2. (U) MND–B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.C.2.B. (U) Continue operations to protect the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.C. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
Description:
List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments. Also explain other operational terms that are not defined in Joint Staff publications.

Reference: JP 5-0 Pg A-7

MNC-I Example:

3.D.1. (U) Tasks Common to All.
3.D.1.B. (U) Conduct IO to drive a wedge between the AIF and the Iraqi population (See Appendix 11, Annex C).
3.D.3.A. (U) Neutralize the Insurgency. Neutralization is achieved when insurgent capability to conduct and sustain operations is degraded to the point the Iraqi Army (IA) can plan and conduct counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in their own battlespace with coalition forces in overwatch providing required enablers.
3.D.3.B. (U) Control of the Iraqi Border. The following five conditions define Iraqi control of the IZ border:
   1 (U) DBE forces deployed in border forts along the entire Iraqi border enforcing border laws and disrupting the cross-border transit of T&FF.
   2 (U) IA postured in-depth, integrated with DBE forces and prepared to respond to DBE requests for assistance.
   3 (U) Roads leading to the Iraqi interior are controlled with ISF using vehicle checkpoints to disrupt T&FF freedom of movement.
   4 (U) Accommodation with local tribes.
   5 (U) Official Ports of Entry (POE) are open and effectively enforce Iraqi border and immigration laws. (MNSTC-I has the lead for POE).
3.D.3.C. (U) Denied Sanctuary. Enemy sanctuary is denied if a commander assesses that the enemy benefits of sanctuary as defined above no longer exist and a coalition force platoon can operate in that area at moderate risk.

4. (U) Force Sustainment.

Description:
Provide a statement of the administrative and logistic arrangements or requirements. Include transportation, marshaling, billeting, clothing, equipment, and special operational funds as appropriate.

Description.
This should provide broad guidance for the theater strategic sustainment concept for the campaign or operation, with information and instructions broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, transportation, personnel policies, and administration.

4.B. (U) Logistics.

Description:
This paragraph addresses the CCDR’s logistics priorities and intent: basing, combat, general, and geospatial engineering requirements, HNS, required contracted support, environmental considerations, mortuary affairs, and Service responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of logistic support for each option and phase of the concept.


Description:
Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required capabilities and functions to command headquarters and other operational requirements.

4.D. (U) Public Affairs. Refer to Annex F.

Description:
Identify key public affairs considerations. Otherwise, provide a summary and include the details in Annex F.


Description:
Identify key civil affairs considerations. Otherwise, provide a summary and include the details in Annex G.

4.F. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. Refer to Annex H.

Description:
Identify key METOC considerations. Otherwise, provide a summary and include the details in Annex H.

4.G. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. Refer to Annex B.

Description:
Identify key geospatial considerations. Otherwise, provide a summary and include the details in Annex B, Appendix 7, Tab A.
4.H. (U) Health Service Support. Refer to Annex Q.

**Description:**
Identify planning requirements and subordinate taskings for joint health services functional areas. Address critical medical supplies and resources to include military working dog patient and movement. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical assumptions and include them in a subparagraph. Otherwise, provide a summary and include details in Annex Q.

**Reference:** JP 5-0 A-7, CJCSM 3130.03A, F 8.9;

**MNC-I Example:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. (U) Administration and Logistics.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.A. (U) Logistics. MNC-I develops sustainment plans, policies and procedures, and postures logistics assets across Iraq in order to support the development of Iraqi Security Forces, while retaining flexibility to support counterinsurgency operations. Key to success is gaining efficiencies in fixed site operations through contracts and LOGCAP support, while retaining expeditionary capability to support operations as required throughout Iraq without loss of momentum. Also critically important is development of concepts to support transition teams arrayed across Iraq while minimizing the logistics footprint. While tactical level logistical support remains a service responsibility, every effort should be made to maximize efficiencies gained through common item support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.A.1. (U) Concept of Coalition Support. CFLCC provides EAC CSS, JRSOI, and Title X support to MNC-I through service channels. COSCOM provides general common item support to all services and Coalition Forces as required, IAW acquisition and cross servicing agreements (ACSA)…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.A.2. (U) Support to Iraqi Security Forces. MNC-I develops IA logistics capability through partnership and doctrine development while providing direct support as required preventing mission failure. Development of institutional and higher-echelon logistics capability in the ISF is critical to Iraqi self-sufficiency…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.A.3. (U) Support to Other US Agencies. Coalition Forces and United Nations. MNC-I may be required to provide common item support, if available, to other US agencies or the United Nations, in accordance with applicable MOUs…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.B. (U) Personnel. (See Annex E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.C. (U) Public Affairs. (See Annex F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.D. (U) Civil Affairs. (See Annex G)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. (U) Command, Signal, and Communications.

**Description:**
Summarize the command arrangements to be employed on execution. Include agreements in place or planned with other government agencies and summarize their respective roles and responsibilities.
5.A. Command.


**Description:**
State the organizational structure expected to exist during plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major C2 organizations and the time of expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandums of understanding used and those that require development.

5.A.2 (U) Command Posts.

**Description:**
List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution. When headquarters are to be deployed or the plan provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing each headquarters.

5.A.3. (U) Succession to Command.

**Description:**
Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific circumstances.


**Description:**
Provide a general statement concerning the scope of communications systems and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight any communications systems or procedures requiring special emphasis.

**Reference:** JP 5-0, A-8, CJCSM 3130.03A, D-A-4, F-10

**MNC-I Example:**

| 5. (U) Command and Control. |
| 5.A. (U) Command. The Commanding General of MNC-I exercises OPCON or TACON of designated forces. MNC-I is OPCON to MNF-I and is headquartered at Camp Victory. |
| 5.A.1. (U) Command Relationships. (See Annex J). MNC-I will establish a partnering relationship at the Division, Brigade, and Battalion levels to advise and support Iraqi Army units at the appropriate echelon. MNC-I also establishes partnership with the Iraqi Police Services at the Provincial Police Headquarters, District Police Headquarters and Police Station level to develop IPS capacity. Police Transition Teams (PTT) are TACON to the MSC to train, coach and mentor IPS. The IPLO assigned to PTT are TACON to the MSC through the PTT and ADCON to MNSTC-I (CPATT) for administration of all personnel matters with the IPLO contractor… |
| 5.A.2. (U) Succession of Command. CG, MNC-I then the senior US MSC CG. |
5.B. (U) Control. (See Annex K.) MNC-I will continue to conduct coalition coordination and command through CENTRIX. Communications support will now transition to cross domain solutions and the installation of FusionNet down to the BDE level. The IAG will conduct administration and coordination of the transition teams over CENTRIX / SIPR and NIPR data networks…

(U) OFFICIAL:

Signature block of Approving Officer